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SENSE AND NONSENSE: STANDING IN THE RACIAL
DISTRICTING CASES AS A WINDOW ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S VIEW OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Judith Reed*
Congressional redistricting draws the lines within which battles for
political power will be fought. It is no surprise, therefore, that the
redistrictingprocess has long been the subject of social debate and legal
dispute. The Supreme Court has not been able to resolve this dispute, in
part, because the Justices have conflicting interpretationsof the right to
vote. While some Justices view voting as an individual right, others
maintain that voting is correctly perceived as group right. This lack of
consensus regarding the definition of the right to vote has led to a
confusing articulationof the harm implicated by recent districtingcases,
and of the identification of which citizens can seek redressfor that harm.
In this Article, the Author provides an overview of modern standing
doctrine and focuses on the Court's application (or non-application) in
districting cases of the requirement that plaintiffs show an injury-in-fact
in order to have standing to sue. It is noted that in recent districting
cases, the Court has allowed standing for the type of generalized
grievancefor which the Court has consistently denied standing in other
areas of law. This deviation from established standing doctrine is often
criticized as nonsensical. The Author however, argues that this new
standing doctrine can only be explained and understood, when limited to
voting cases, as reflective of the individualjustices' interpretationsof the
right to vote. The Author concludes that the atypical standing doctrine
articulated in the recent districting cases underscores the need for the
Court to develop and employ a richerconception of the right to vote that
encompasses the goal of achieving a politicallyfair system.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike the rain forests of the planet, the "political thicket,"la
much used metaphor for the Supreme Court's forays into questions of apportionment, has not grown less dense over time.
Political apportionment and redistricting issues are brought before
the Court with a frequency probably not foreseen when it first
decided to enter the political thicket in Baker v. Carr.2 Each succeeding decennial round of redistricting3 brings with it spirited
1. This phrase was first used by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (denominating reapportionment cases as incapable of judicial
resolution by virtue of their non-justiciability).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding equal protection challenges to reapportionment
are justiciable by federal courts).
3. The Constitution requires that the numbers of persons represented by those
elected to the House of Representatives be calculated by an "actual Enumeration...
made within.., every.., ten Years." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2. The number of representatives are then "apportioned" on the basis of one for every 30,000 persons, except
that each state, regardless of population, is entitled to at least one representative. See
id. Thus, the term "reapportionment" refers to the process of allocating congressional
seats to each state based on population. As population shifts occur, a state may gain
or lose the number of seats allocated to that state as a result of reapportionment. The
term "redistricting" or "districting" refers to the actual line-drawing process that
takes place to reflect the seat allocation and/or population shifts based on reappor-
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challenges.4 The 1990 Congressional redistricting proved to be no
exception. Prior to the 1990 round of districting, statutory and constitutional challenges to redistricting raised two broad issues. One
was whether a plan whose districts were not equally populated
violated equal protection law.5 The other dealt with the racial or
political fairness of the districting plan.6 In a line of three decisions
beginning in 1993, Shaw v. Reno7 Miller v. Johnson,8 and Bush v. Vera,9
the Court announced and then refined a new cause of action. In
United States v. Hays,"0 the Court determined who might bring this
new districting claim, allowing persons who live in voting districts
created in substantial part based on race the right to bring an equal
protection challenge to their voting districts. This new claim could
be brought without any showing that the plaintiffs were or might be
injured in any way previously delimited by the Court as legally
cognizable." Such districts would then be subjected to strict scrutiny,
requiring a constitutionally adequate justification for their creation.
Given the law on standing," established voting rights, and equal
protection, plaintiffs who claimed neither that they were prevented
from voting nor suffered any vote dilution, and who put forth no
proof of any particularized injury at any stage of the litigation,
should have been denied standing to bring these claims.
The Court disregarded existing standing law in this series of
districting cases, and it did so in a way that was normatively differtionment and census data. The terms "reapportionment" and "districting" are often
used interchangeably.
4. See Ronald E. Weber, Redistrictingand the Courts:JudicialActivism in the 1990s,
23 AM. POL. Q. 205 (1995) (listing states that faced litigation during the 1990s). For an
example of a "spirited challenge," see Richard Engstrom, Councilmanic Redistricting
Conflicts: The Dallas Experience, 6 URBAN NEWS 1, 4-8 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (holding that congressional districts must be as "nearly of equal population as is practicable").
6. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (holding claims of
partisan gerrymandering justiciable); Busbee v. Smith, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (striking
down Georgia's post-1980 reapportionment as intentionally discriminatory because
the evidence showed that the plan consciously attempted to maximize the voting
strength of White persons and minimize the voting strength of Blacks); United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) (holding constitutional
use of racial criteria in a New York congressional districting plan that divided
Brooklyn's Hasidic Jewish community to shore up a majority African American
district).
7. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I].
8. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
9. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
10. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See infra Part II.
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ent from prior voting rights decisions. The Court created a special
exception to previously articulated standing doctrine that is facially
aberrational and nonsensical, but one that I argue, viewed from the
Court's individual approach to voting rights, makes a great deal of
sense. In this article, I examine the recent districting decisions
through the prism of standing, and the way in which the Court's
extraordinary departure from its own recent standing jurisprudence
is informed by, and is consistent with, the various views of the right
to vote held by the current justices.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of modem standing
law and focuses on the Court's application (or non-application) in
the recent districting cases of the requirement that plaintiffs show an
injury-in-fact in order to have standing to sue. The Court's decisions
have left it vulnerable to a number of criticisms, chief among them
that the purported "analytically distinct claim"'16 brought by Shaw
plaintiffs is just the sort of generalized grievance for which the Court
has consistently denied standing. 7 In order to circumvent this criticism, the Court attempted to individualize the purported injury to
fit within the parameters of standing law. 8
Part II explores the current sitting justices' views on voting
rights-the underpinning of the individualization of the Shaw claim.
In this part, I conclude that the Shaw decisions, contrary to the hopeful rationale offered by Justice Stevens,' 9 are not grounded in any
sort of liberalized standing rule that might arguably benefit civil
rights plaintiffs or plaintiffs in general. Rather, I argue that the
Court's creation of a new and exceptional view of standing is limited
to voting cases and stems from its crabbed notion of what voting
means. The ease with which the Court turned a generalized grievance into an individual harm derived, in large part, from the Court's
expansion of the individual rights branch of equal protection that
became ascendant in the Court's consideration of affirmative action

15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part I.B.
Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); Miller, 515 U.S. at 911 (1995).
See infra notes 37-43.
See infra Part I.B.2.

19.

In Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw II], Justice Stevens

posed a question in his dissenting opinion that highlighted the underlying tension in

the court's ruling:
[The Court] must either mean to take a broader view of the power of
federal courts to entertain challenges to race-based governmental action than it has heretofore adopted... or to create a special exception
to general jurisdictional limitations to plaintiffs such as those before

us here.... I charitably assume the former to be the case.
Id. at 929 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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cases.20 That same prioritization of individual rights has become
prevalent in the voting rights arena. While the Equal Protection
Clause involves both group and individual rights, the concept of
group rights has at least facial attractiveness in antidiscrimination
law because treatment of individual members of outsider groups is
usually linked to membership in that group.2 At the intersection of
race and voting rights, the theme of group rights demands examination. In the Shaw cases, the Court, ignoring standing law and wellestablished vote dilution jurisprudence, made the wrong turn at this
intersection. It defined a new right affecting political representation,
determined who had standing to assert it, and cemented the individualization of that right in the process. I argue that such
individualization of a quintessentially political claim is seemingly
nonsensical because it is contrary to modem standing law, but if
placed in the context of the Court's view of the right to vote, Shaw
standing makes sense.
The Shaw cases reveal the Court's error on standing to be symptomatic of a deeper problem: the Court has yet to arrive at a
coherent theory of the meaning of the right to vote. In Part III, I discuss the options facing the Court as the year 2000 approaches,
bringing with it a new round of apportionment and districting.
While the Court now has ample evidence that it should abandon the
path it started down with Shaw I as unprincipled and lacking support in equal protection and voting rights jurisprudence, the Court is
not likely to do so. Accordingly, I argue that the Court must develop
and employ a richer conception of the right to vote that encompasses
the goal of achieving a politically fair system. That system should
not only protect the individual right to vote and guard against minority vote dilution, but also achieve adequate representation for all
population groups.

20. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(striking City's program setting aside 30% of construction contracts for minority
contractors, for lack of factual justification referring to a "'personal right[]' to be
treated with equal dignity and respect"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1977) (upholding challenge by white male applicant to State
medical school's special admissions program, characterizing the wrong "the denial
of [a] right to individualized consideration without regard to his race").
21.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, 1438 n.18,

§ 16-22, 1527-28 (2d ed. 1988); Owen M. Fiss, Groupsand the Equal Protection Clause, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).

22. As the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized, "racial discrimination is by
definition class discrimination." General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 157 (1982).
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I. WHY SHAW DOES NOT MAKE SENSE:
INDIVIDUALIZED INJURY IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT

Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over "cases" and
"controversies. '" The case or controversy requirement prevents
federal courts from dealing with "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions." 24 Standing is one of a set of doctrines, such as
justiciability, mootness, and ripeness, that limit the power of the
judiciary.5 The doctrine of standing addresses whether a particular
person or party is the proper plaintiff to seek relief from the courts.
It requires a court to determine "whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." 26 In theory, the standing inquiry focuses on the party
attempting to present his claim; the actual issues to be litigated become secondary.27 Whether courts adhere to this concept in actual
practice has been debated.28
Placing limits on who can sue in federal court is thought to
serve several important values. It may respect the separation of
powers principle, prevent a flood of lawsuits, improve judicial decision-making by requiring a specific controversy, and serve fairness
by ensuring that litigants raise only the rights they have. 29 The law of
standing has long been criticized as incoherent and inconsistent-a
way for a court to open and close doors to the courthouse at will,
depending on whether it wants to reach the merits or resolve the
issues raised.3 Rather than ruling in a way that might have dispelled

23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. TRIBE, supra note 21, § 3-9, at 73 (citing Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 312 U.S. 450, 461 (1945)).
25.
26.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.1,42-46 (2d ed. 1994).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

27.

TRIBE, supra note 21, § 3-14, at 107 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99

(1968)).

28. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 226 (1988)
("One may see in some of the behavior, if not always in the language of the Court a
recognition that standing questions are questions on the merits.").
29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 2.3, at 55-56.
30. The Supreme Court itself has, on more than one occasion, "acknowledged...
that 'the concept of Art. III' standing has not been defined with complete consistency
in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it."' Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)); see
also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and
dissenting) (criticizing the Court's use of "standing to slam the courthouse door
against plaintiffs"); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 151 (1970) ("Igleneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as
such").
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this widely held impression, the Court found in the Shaw cases
standing that could only confirm that impression. Part L.A briefly
describes the state of modem standing law. Part I.B relates the way
in which the Court attempts to locate and revamp the possible bases
for granting standing to the Shaw plaintiffs.
A. Modern Standing Law
The Court has, over time, articulated three requirements for
standing to sue: injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.31 For
standing purposes the injury must be both "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical., 3' A party also must show that there exists a causal
connection between that injury and the challenged conduct.n Finally, a party must show a likelihood that the proven injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. 34
1. Personal Injury-in-Fact
First articulated in Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,5 the injury-in-fact requirement may be satisfied
Commentators have expressed similar views. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 2.3, at 54 (noting that "[sitanding frequently has been identified by both
justices and commentators as one of the most confused areas of the law"); TRIBE,
supra note 21, § 3-14, at 107 (noting current standing law as "present[ing] substantial
confusion at a number of points"). Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV.
227, 233-34 (1990) (criticizing the court for answering the questions of "what parties
should be allowed to participate in a case" and "what issues should they be allowed
to raise ... on a seemingly ad hoc basis" and "[a]s a result, the doctrines are in conflict
and the resolution of article III issues is often unpredictable"); see also Girardeau
A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1422, 1452 (1995) ("Doctrinal
inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's law of standing are now so commonplace
that they have become relatively uninteresting. And the insight that the Court manipulates the law of standing to advance judicial policy preferences has become
more fatuous than scandalous.") (internal footnotes omitted); Maxwell L. Steams,
Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1323
(1995) (describing standing as a way for the Court to "fend off challenges to governmental conduct that are brought primarily on an ideological basis"); Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992) (criticizing the Court's decision in Lujan as misinterpreting the Constitution).
31. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
32. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
33. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
34. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
35. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Prior to this articulation, the test was whether a plaintiff
could show a "legal injury," which would permit suits by people affected by governmental action. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 183-184.
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by a party's alleging and showing that "he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury
must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.' "'3The injury must also be "distinct and palpable. 37
The harm envisioned is one that is specific to the individual asserting the claim.m The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
plaintiff may not ordinarily invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts "when the harm asserted by plaintiff is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
A generalized grievance arises "where the plaintiffs
citizens... ,,39
sue solely as citizens concerned with having the government follow
the law or as taxpayers interested in restraining allegedly illegal
governmental expenditures."4' Until recently, it had been thought
that the limitation
on generalized grievances was merely prudential
41
in nature. In Lujan, however, the Court emphasized that this ban
was a constitutional rather than a prudential limitation.4 In several
36. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (citations omitted).
37. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). See also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (stating that the "injury... must be concrete in both a qualitative
and temporal sense").
38. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (proclaiming that "a plaintiff's complaint must establish that he has a 'personal stake' in the alleged dispute,
and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him") (emphasis added);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 n.1 (1992) (requiring that the
plaintiff must have suffered a "particularized" injury, which means that "the injury
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way" to have standing) (emphasis
added); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (stating that
the party who invokes the court's authority "must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant") (emphasis added).
39. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted).
40. Id.; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220
(1974) (holding that standing to sue may not be predicated on an interest of the kind
which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily
abstract nature of injury all citizens share); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173
(1974) (holding that a taxpayer may not use federal court as a forum in which to air
his generalized grievances about conduct of government or allocation of power in
the federal system); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (holding that a private
individual may not invoke judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action without showing that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the action, and it is not sufficient that the
individual has merely a general interest common to all members of the public).
41. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer standing in
First Amendment challenge of federal subsidies to parochial schools, emphasizing
the prudential rather than constitutional character of the prohibition against generalized grievances); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (rejecting a suit by
taxpayer seeking to challenge financial grants to states under the Federal Maternity
Act of 1921 as violative of the Tenth Amendment).
42. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
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recent post-Lujan cases the Court has emphasized that it has every
intention of requiring a precise showing from plaintiffs.43 Even when
the plaintiff has alleged a redressable injury sufficient to meet the
requirements of Article III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating "abstract questions of wide public significance" which amount to
generalized grievances, pervasively shared and more appropriately
addressed to the representative branches." This is so even if denying
standing to the plaintiffs before the Court means that the matter will
not be heardi 5
2. Redressability and Causation
A plaintiff must show more than an injury in fact; causation and
redressability are distinct and separate requirements for standing.4
In order for a federal court to hear a case, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant's conduct caused the injury and that a favorable outcome will likely remedy the harm suffered.47

The three elements of standing are an "irreducible minimum,"4 8
and they cannot be waived. 49 Moreover, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily
establish standing through mere allegations. As the Court recently
emphasized, a plaintiff must demonstrate with probative evidence
each element:
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Since they are not
43. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765, 772 (1999) (noting in a census case that the court has repeatedly
required a plaintiff to allege personal injury fairly traceable to the plaintiffs); Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2099 (1998) (recognizing the importance of
respecting constitutional limits on the court's jurisdiction); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 820-21 (1997) (putting aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of
the dispute because of the overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the
judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere).
44. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
45. See Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 227 (quoting Richardson,418 U.S. at 179).
46. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

47.

See

CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 25, § 2.3.3, at 72-73 (stating that these require-

ments have been labeled "causation" and "redressability"); see also Northeastern Fla.
Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 664
(1993) (stating that causation and redressability are distinct hurdles in addition to
demonstration of "injury-in-fact" to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction).
48. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
49. A court is obligated to raise the issue of standing sua sponte if the parties do
not. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 25, § 2.3.1, at 58 (stating that federal courts can raise standing on their own
"[b]ecause standing is jurisdictional ... and it may be challenged at any point in the
federal court proceedings.").
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mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. with
the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation. [T]hose facts...
must be "supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial."50
The next section focuses on the Court's circumvention of its
own standards in the racial districting cases. The Court often makes
more than one attempt to articulate an injury, and these articulations
are sometimes quite different from the plaintiffs' own descriptions.
This section discusses the way in which the Court has manipulated
the standing doctrine to allow plaintiffs in these cases to litigate
claims that did not fit within previously announced categories of
harm.
B.Shaw Standing
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the use of any voting practice or procedure that results in making it more difficult for
racial or language minority groups "to participate in the political
process and elect candidates of choice."'" Section 5 of the Act requires that certain states and political subdivisions obtain prior
authorization, or "preclearance," before implementing changes in
prior practices or procedures affecting voting.12 Each of the cases in

50. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (emphasis added)
(quoting Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 113 n.31 (1979)); see also
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156 (1995) (requiring that a "litigant must
clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing
requirements [since a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by
embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.") (citations omitted).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(b) (1994). The 1982 amendment to § 2 of the Act made
clear that plaintiffs bringing suit under this statute were not required to prove intent
to discriminate. See H.R. REP. No. 97-227, at 29-30 (1981).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). Jurisdictions become "covered" pursuant to a formula
set forth in § 4 of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Section 5 was enacted to counter
the persistent ingenuity of many of the Southern states, who, once sued, would
simply switch to new practices or implement new tests for voter registration. See
H.R. REP. No. 97-227 at 4; S.REP. No. 97-417 at 6; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314, 335 (1966) (summarizing difficulties experienced by plaintiffs
attempting to litigate voting rights claims and enforce court orders, because of evasive tactics utilized by defendants). The triggering formula looks to whether a state
or political subdivision used a literacy test for voter registration as of specified dates,
and whether voter registration or turnout fell below 50% of the voting age population in certain presidential elections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Entire states may be
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the Shaw quartet 53 involved congressional districting and followed a
similar pattern. The defendant states, North Carolina, Texas, Georgia and Louisiana, were among those jurisdictions required to
submit any new districting arrangement to the United States Department of Justice before holding elections under such districting.
Over the years, the Justice Department has taken an active stance
with regard to its § 5 authority.' Perhaps the Shaw decisions were an
inevitable product of the Department's vigorous use of this enforcement power," along with the availability of increasingly
sophisticated computer programming software.56 For covered jurisdictions, Justice Department preclearance became a familiar ritual. A
jurisdiction would submit its districting plan and supporting documentation to the Justice Department, 7 which is mandated by statute
to take action within a specified time period. When the Department

covered, as is the case for Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia, or coverage may be limited
to designated counties. Forty counties in North Carolina fall within the strictures of
§ 5. See 28 C.F.R. § 51, app. (1998) (Jurisdictions Covered Under Section 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act, as Amended). When an entire state is not covered, any change
that would affect the covered counties, such as a congressional districting plan,
requires preclearance.
53. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
54. Much of the success in integrating the halls of Congress is considered to be a
result of the Voting Rights Act which is, "perhaps the single most effective civil
rights bill ever passed." Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights
Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE VOTING
RIGHTS AcT 1965-1990 378, 386 (Chandler Davidson et al. eds., 1994). The Justice
Department is charged with enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, and § 5 was
considered to be particularly important because it might "shift the advantage of time
and inertia" from proven wrongdoers to the victims of discrimination. Drew S. Days,
III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 167, 167-68 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describing the background of
§ 5 and providing statistics on early experience under § 5).
55. In the Shaw line of cases, the Court clearly expressed its view that the states'
plans reflected too much the imprimatur of the Justice Department. See, e.g., Miller,
515 U.S. at 909 (noting that states do not have "a compelling state interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates the Justice Department issues").
56. Advanced geographical software, developed in the 1980s, allowed plan
drafters to fine tune demographic data to a greater extent possible than in before.
This meant that racial data, available at the census block level, enabled drafters to
move around small segments of population groups. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over
the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255-256
(1993) [hereinafter Karlan, All Over the Map]. See also Vera, 517 U.S. at 961-962
(discussing the computer software program used to draw district lines and noting
the presence of greater detail for racial data than other data, such as party registration and elctoral results of).
57. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.27, 51.28 (defining required and supplemental contents of
submission).
58. The Justice Department has up to 60 days after receipt of all information
relating to a submission to object to the jurisdiction's voting change or ask for addi-
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refused to approve a plan, a jurisdiction often revised the plan to
meet the Department's objections. 9 In three of the four Shaw cases,
the Justice Department had rejected the state's original plan.60 Plaintiffs subsequently challenged plans implemented following
preclearance.
1. The Generalized Nature of the Purported Harms
The requirement of an individual plaintiff to present a particularized and concrete injury-in-fact should have posed a significant
barrier to the Shaw I plaintiffs, who claimed neither a violation of
equal protection nor vote dilution.61 The plaintiffs asserted that
North Carolina had violated "their constitutional right to participate
in a 'color-blind electoral process.' ,,62 After the Justice Department's

tional information. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.37, 51.41. If there is no correspondence forthcoming from the Department after the expiration of the 60-day period, a jurisdiction
may implement the change. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.42.
59. A jurisdiction may implement a voting change without obtaining Justice
Department preclearance only by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10. Very few jurisdictions have
exercised this option. See, e.g., Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D.D.C. 1982)
(three-judge court), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (determining the State of Georgia could
seek declaratory judgment from the District of Columbia District Court approving a
districting plan under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). An oft-taken route is to
engage in informal discussions with the reviewing government attorneys. See, e.g.,
United Org. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977) (referring to meetings and conversations between New York's reapportionment committee and Justice
Department officials regarding appropriate district demographics). See, e.g., Drew S.
Days, III,
Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE,

52, 60-61 (Bernard

Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (explaining Department's reliance on
"negotiations with submitting jurisdictions rather than on coercive measures" as
necessary to balance competing concerns, inter alia, of local discretion, concerns of
civil rights organizations with efficiency).
60. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 906-08 ("Twice spurned, the General Assembly set out
to create three majority-minority districts to gain preclearance."); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 740 (1995) (noting that preclearance was refused based on the
state's failure to "demonstrate that its decision to not create a second majorityminority district was free of racially discriminatory purpose"); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630,
635 (1993) (Attorney General's failure to preclear North Carolina's first attempt
because of the state's unsubstantiated failure to create a second majority-minority
district "to give effect to Black and Native American voting strength"). Texas managed to gain preclearance on its first attempt. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 957.
61. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 641 (noting that plaintiffs do not claim the plan
"unconstitutionally 'diluted' White voting strength [since t]hey do not even claim to
be White"); see also Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 921 (1996) (Stevens, J.,dissenting)
("[P]laintiffs... do not claim that they have been shut out of the electoral process on
account of race, or that their voting power has been diluted ...").
62. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 642; see also Melvyn R. Durchslag, United States v. Hays:
An Essay on Standing to ChallengeMajority-Minority Voting Districts,65 U. CIN. L. REV.
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objection of North Carolina's initial redistricting plan, the state obtained preclearance for a revised plan containing two majority-Black
districts.3 The Shaw I plaintiffs challenged this plan, alleging that it
was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the
United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act." The district
court dismissed the action on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction
to grant the injunctive relief requested under the Voting Rights Act,6s
and that plaintiffs had failed to state a constitutional claim.66 The
Supreme Court reversed.
Recognizing that prior holdings did not preclude raceconscious decisionmaking in general, nor race-conscious apportionment in particular, 7 the Supreme Court reversed, recasting
plaintiffs' novel claim. The plaintiffs' objection, according to the
Court, went to "redistricting legislation that is... so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to
segregate the races for the purposes of voting... ."6 Such districting
could be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. 6 Although
341, 359-64 (1997) (implying that had the Court limited injury requirements to a
systemic one, such as a colorblind electoral process, it might have achieved some
consistency in standing in some of the jury discrimination cases relied on by the
Court).
63. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina was entitled to an additional
congressional seat. The state's initial plan drew an objection from the Justice Department, because the plan contained only one district out of twelve where African
Americans, who constituted 20% of the North Carolina's population, were a majority. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 633-34. In response, the legislature drew district 12, the
now infamous 1-85 district. See id. at 635-36 (describing district as "snakelike" and as
one where a person "driv[ing] down the interstate with both car doors open [would]
kill most of the people in the district"). The 12th district followed the route of the
interstate highway in the north-central area of the state. Evidence showed that the
district was drawn in this area of the state rather than in the south-central and southeastern area of the state, as suggested by the Department of Justice, in order to
protect White Democratic incumbents. See id. at 674 (White, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 637.
65. Plaintiffs' claim under the Voting Rights Act was a challenge to the Attorney
General's decision to approve the plan. See id. at 637-638. That claim was dismissed
because of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the District Court for the District of
Columbia to review decisions relating to preclearance and the immunity of the
Attorney General's § 5 review decision pursuant to Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491
(1977). An earlier challenge to the precleared plan as a political gerrymander also
failed. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
66. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 638-639.
67. See id. at 642 (stating that "[tIhis court has never held that race-conscious
state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances").
68. Id.
69. The court stated that:
[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation,
though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as
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the Shaw I plaintiffs had alleged no specific harms, the majority
stepped in to fill this gap. In the Court's view, "reapportionment is
one area in which appearances do matter." ° A plan that Justice
O'Connor described as "bear[ing] an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid" 71 might injure voters in three ways. First, the
Court suggested that racial classifications "threaten to stigmatize
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group." 72 Second, a districting plan containing irregularly shaped minority
districts "reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine
our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their
constituency as a whole."7 3 Third, such stereotyping could
"exacerbate" patterns of racial bloc voting 74 and serve to "balkanize"
the nation. 7
The articulation of such harms produced no "precise theory of
how these harms could come about," thus raising several unanswered questions. 76 First, were these proposed harms concrete
enough to satisfy traditional standing requirements? Second, how
might White voters-or, indeed, a voter of any race-be
"stigmatized" by being placed in a district that, in reality, was quite
integrated?m Third, how would a plaintiff connect an increase in
racial bloc voting, if any, with the creation of particular districts,
especially since proof of racially polarized voting would likely be

anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts
on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.
Id. at 649.
70. Id. at 647.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 643. But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 931 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (dismissing this sort of injury as giving Shaw plaintiffs standing to sue,
stating that, "White voters obviously lack standing to complain of the other injury
the Court has recognized under Shaw: the stigma blacks supposedly suffer when
assigned to a District because of their race") (citations omitted).
73. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 650.
74. See id. at 647.
75. See id. at 656.
76. Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial
GerrymanderingCases, 1 MICH. J. RACE & LAw 47, 53-54 (1996). See also Miller, 515
U.S. at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding the Court for its "fail[ure] to explain
adequately what showing a plaintiff must make to establish standing to litigate the
newly minted Shaw claim," and for not "coherently articulat[ing] what injury this
cause of action is designed to redress").
77. See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHm. LEGAL F. 83, 94 [hereinafter Karlan, Our Separatism]
(describing the challenged districts as "the most integrated... in the nation").
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unavailable until after a few elections in the new district?7 Finally,
how might one measure whether these districts actually did
"balkanize" the nation? In practice, answers to these questions
would not be forthcoming, since plaintiffs in racial districting cases
would not be required to prove any injury at all. In addition, the
Court ultimately focused on only the second of the purported
inju''
ries-later reconstructed as a "representational harm."
After Shaw I, the decision in Miller v. Johnson ° served only to ensure that constitutional challenges to race-conscious districting
would proliferate, as the Court removed any limiting principle that
a "bizarre" shape might have provided. In Miller, the Court, despite
its previous indication that a Shaw claim would likely only arise in
the "exceptional cases" of "highly irregular districts,"8 disavowed
the importance of shape. According to the Court, Shaw I was "not
meant to suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face before
there is a constitutional violation. 8 2 The applicability of strict scrutiny would turn instead on whether racial considerations
predominated over traditional districting principles, such as compactness, contiguity and respect for political subdivisions.8 Shape,
while relevant, was only "persuasive circumstantial evidence" that
"race... was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in

78. See, Thornbugh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57 (1986)(holding that "a pattern of
racial bloc voting that extends over a period of time is more probative of a claim that
a district experiences legally significant polarization than are the results of a single
election.").
79. See infra at notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
80. 515 U.S. 900 (1996). Georgia was awarded an additional congressional seat
based on the 1990 census data that also indicated that African Americans comprised
27% of the total population. After having its plan rejected twice by the Justice Department for the failure of the state to create a third majority-minority district, the
legislature created the challenged districting plan by shifting African American
population centers. See id. at 906-908.
81. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646; see also id. at 685-86 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[iut may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely
that this case will wind up an aberration" ); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting, Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REv. 588 (1993) (suggesting that one way to read Shaw I is as a signal from
Court to states that they had gone too far in the use of race in districting, through use
of an extreme case).
82. Miller,515 U.S. at 912.
83. Id. at 916. Contiguity turns on whether one can travel to all parts of a district
without leaving the district, while compactness tends to turn more on shape, and a
respect for political subdivisions, looks to whether county, city or other boundaries
have been unnecessarily divided. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 917. The Miller Court added
another less-used criterion, respect for communities that share similar interests. See
Richard L. Engstrom, Shaw, Miller and the Districting Thicket, 84 NAT'L Civic REV.
323, 325-330 (1995) (discussing the various criteria).
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drawing its district lines." This was true, the Court said, because
the "essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw [was]
that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters into districts." 8

Nor would the presence of other, non-racial motivations matter.
For example, the Court in Bush v. Vera 86 held that strict scrutiny
would apply to congressional districts drawn to accommodate an
interest both in incumbent protection and in creating districts that
offered electoral opportunity for African American and Hispanic
populations.87 Having decided years earlier that partisan gerrymandering might be unconstitutional, but only in limited
circumstances,8 the Court affirmed the district court's ruling striking down the three majority-minority districts in the Texas plan. In
so doing, the Court accepted the district court's parsing of the competing interests of race, ethnicity, and politics in addition to the
lower court's its concomitant finding that race either predominated

84. Miller, 515 U.S. at 913. After Miller, proof of a racial motive would be sufficient, even where the offending district was "pleasing" in appearance. Georgia's 11th
district (one of the three majority Black districts) "by comparison with other districts"
was concededly "not... bizarre on its face." Id. at 917. The "predominance" of race
might be determined to exist by virtue of the fact that the plan's drafters had subordinated traditional principles of districting to racial concerns.
This broad, imprecise definition raised at least two questions which the Court
ignored. First, as the Court itself noted in Shaw I, traditional factors, such as compactness, are not constitutionally mandated. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647. Second, in
Miller, the Georgia legislature had, prior to drawing the districts, ranked the factors
to be used. Ahead of "nondilution of minority voting strength" and compliance with
the Voting Rights Act were the requirements of equipopulation and contiguity, but
consideration of compactness and maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions
were lower in the State's hierarchy. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 906. Thus, Georgia had
made a determination that it was constitutionally permitted to make, and then acted
on it. Yet, the majority held that a showing by plaintiffs that the "legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including... compactness,
contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities ... to racial considerations," sufficed to make out a prima facie case. Id. at 916.
85. Id. at 911; cf DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd, 515
U.S. 1170 (1995) (upholding deliberate creation of compact minority districts).
86. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
87. Essentially, the evidence in Vera forced the Court to confront the potential
incongruity of requiring majority-minority districts to conform to traditional districting principles, such as compactness and contiguity, while not holding majority
White districts to the same standard. See id. at 975-76. The Texas plan included one
especially strange district drawn precisely to protect an incumbent. See id. This raised
the issue of whether incumbent protection ranks higher than avoidance of minority
vote dilution. See id. at 969.
88. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-133 (1986) (stating that "the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to
effectively influence the political process").
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over partisan interests or acted as a proxy to support those interests.89
By defining a new right and delineating injuries that might flow
from a violation of this new right, the Court had let the proverbial
genie out of the bottle. The Court's definition of an injury in Shaw I
made it appear that there was an unlimited universe of possible
plaintiffs, ranging from anyone within a given state to anyone in the
continental United States. The purported harms identified by the
Court arguably could be felt by, and therefore confer standing on,
any United States citizen. A logical inference from finding an amorphous right to a color-blind electoral process was that any racial
gerrymandering of a district would at least be a wrong to a state as a
whole, 0 but perhaps to the country as a whole, since each state is
represented in Congress. 91 This articulation of the harms made the
Shaw plaintiffs' claims generalized grievances for which they should
not have been granted standing had the Court followed its own
precedent.92
For example, in a 1984 case, the Court had denied standing to
the parents of Black public school children who challenged the failure of the Internal Revenue Service to ensure that White academies
in several states were not receiving tax exemptions in violation of
the Internal Revenue Code. 93 Whether plaintiffs' claim was interpreted as premised on a right to a government that enforces law or
resting on an allegation that all members of a racial group suffered
denigration when the government discriminates on the basis of
89. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 969 (holding that the district court had "ample bases on
which to conclude... that racially motivated gerrymandering had a qualitatively
greater influence on the drawing of district lines than politically motivated gerrymandering").
90. Cf Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (rejecting [dilution] claim,
noting that the "wrong [was one] suffered by [the state] as a polity"). This is precisely
how the Shaw I plaintiffs must have viewed their injury when they made the assertion that the districting plan "discriminates" against every voter in the state.
91. Of course, then standing in Shaw would be left without any real limiting
principle; there would be no reason to deny standing to sue to any registered voter
residing in the United States.
92. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633
(1937); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 2.3, at 89 (in each of the above cases, plaintiffs

sued not because of any personalized injury to their own constitutional rights but
rather as taxpayers or citizens objecting to alleged unconstitutional government
action).
93.

See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). The IRS was required to deny

tax-exempt status under section 501(a) and (c) (3) to institutions that practiced racial
discrimination. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983) (holding
that nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory
admission standards on the basis of religious doctrine do not qualify as tax-exempt
organizations under the Internal Revenue Code).
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race,9 4 Justice O'Connor, the author of Shaw I, concluded that it was
insufficient to confer standing for two reasons. First, a holding that
anyone could sue for a failure of the government to enforce the law
amounted to a grant of "citizen standing," conferrable only by statute.95 Second, if all members of the racial or ethnic group were
injured, then no one person could claim a personal denial of equal
treatment.9 6 Thus, while the Court in Allen was concerned that a
grant of standing on the basis of an "abstract stigmatic injury,"
would mean that "[a] Black person in Hawaii could challenge the
grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in
Maine," 97 the Shaw Court expressed no similar unease-with the prospect of limitless (usually White) plaintiffs.98
The Shaw plaintiffs themselves viewed their claim as one that
encompassed more than a personal injury. They had alleged that the
1990 districting "abridged the rights of the plaintiffs and all other
citizens and registered voters of North Carolina.... Any registered
voter, .... has standing to object."' In their interrogatory responses,
plaintiffs paradoxically asserted that the districting plan
"discriminates" against every voter in the state. They argued that
"the State's [districting plan] discriminates against all voters, of
whatever race," and that it "discriminate[d] against plaintiffs and all
other voters in North Carolina."'
Such assertions highlighted a failure of proof that should have
been a fatal flaw in the case. A discriminatory districting plan is a
scheme-such as that in Baker v. Carr'0 ' or Gomillion v. Lightfoot 0 2 --

94.

See Allen, 468 U.S. at 753-54.

95.

See id. at 754-55 (citations omitted).

96.

See id. at 755.

97. Id. at 756. Justice Brennan notes that the majority's holding in this aspect
resulted from a mischaracterization of the allegations in the complaint. Under Justice
Brennan's reading of the complaint, the stigmatic claim was limited to "Black children attending public schools in districts that are currently desegregating yet contain
discriminatory private schools benefiting from illegal tax exemptions." Id. at 770 n.3
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. This striking inconsistency by Justice O'Connor in the treatment of the Black
plaintiffs in Allen and the White plaintiffs in Shaw I led one scholar to dub the two
cases "photographic negatives" of each other. See Karlan, All Over the Map supra note
56, at 280.
99. Complaint at 12-13, Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1992)
(No. CIVA92-202-CIV-5BR) (emphasis added).
100. Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant-Intervenors' First Set of Written Interrogatories at 21, Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1992) (No. CIVA92202-CIV-5BR) (emphasis added).
101. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding plaintiff's claim of a denial of equal protection
justiciable because of the state's failure to reapportion election seats, despite increasing population disparities).
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which places one group of voters at a disadvantage compared to the
remaining voters. It made no sense to assert that a districting plan
imposed such a comparative disadvantage on all voters in a state.
The complaints filed, although containing repeated and specific
allegations of a constitutional violation, made no specific reference
to any injury to the plaintiffs. By their own admission, the plaintiffs
pursued their action not because of any specific injury, but rather
because they wished to advance their ideologically-driven constitutional theory regarding the North Carolina districting plan.'0 3 The
Court has noted on more than one occasion that standing does not
rest on "the sincerity of [a party's] stated objectives [but rather on]
possession of the requisite.., interest that is, or is threatened to be,
injured by the unconstitutional conduct."' 4 Consequently, the
Court's first articulation of an injury sufficient to support standing
fell short of the mark. As Justice Stevens noted, the Court was unable to articulate a coherent rationale for granting the Shaw plaintiffs
the right to sue under the Equal Protection Clause.' 5
The Shaw line of decisions sparked a debate among legal scholars. Critics assailed the Court for its major departure from earlier

102. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a manipulation of municipal
boundaries to exclude Black citizens).
103. As one of the plaintiffs explained, "we... felt that this was an objectionable
district on constitutional grounds and we thought we would strike a blow for what
we thought was a righteous cause." Deposition of Melvin Shimm, Oct. 27, 1993, at 40,
Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1992) (No. CWVA92-202-CIV-5BR).
See also Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 922 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that what
plaintiffs objected to was "not... any adverse consequence that [they], on account of
their race, had suffered more than other persons, but rather [because] the State's
failure to obey a constitutional command to legislate in a color-blind manner conveyed a message to voters across the State that 'there are two Black districts and ten
White districts.' ") (citation omitted).
104. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.12, 225226 (1974) (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952)). See also
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (denying standing to death row
inmate to raise claim as a citizen to ensure that no death sentence was carried out in
violation of the Eighth Amendment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)
(stating that a "mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest
and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not
sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or
,aggrieved'....").
105. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 686 (1993). See also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
929 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding an absence of a "legally cognizable injury"); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 734, 750 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The majority fails to explain coherently how a State discriminates invidiously by deliberately joining members of different races in the same district; why
such placement amounts to an injury to members of any race; and, assuming it does,
to whom.").
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cases on standing and voting rights.0 6 At its broadest, the critique
most incisively articulated by Professor Pamela Karlan was that the
plaintiffs in Shaw I could meet none of the three standing prongs that
the Court had carefully established in earlier jurisprudence.'
The
Court had failed to articulate any cognizable injury, and the plaintiffs could not show that a favorable ruling would cure any
purported injury, since even if the districts were redrawn, there was
no guarantee that the same plaintiffs wouldn't again be subject to
the same injury. °8 Finally, Karlan noted that the plaintiffs could not
show causation, the third prong of standing, because there was no
necessary correlation between the racial classification of voters and
the defined resulting harm. The same harm would occur to one who
lived in the district's geographical area at the time of the districting
as to one who moved into district after the district was created, and
who therefore could not have been personally classified by race.109
Other critics focused more closely on the injury component.11
An injury that rested on the notion that any citizen has the right to a
106. See, e.g., James U. Blacksher, Majority Black Districts, Kiryas Joel, and Other
Challenges to American Nationalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 407, 450 (1995-1996) [hereinafter
Blacksher, Majority Black Districts] (noting that the majority in Shaw, Miller, and
Kiryas Joel had to concede that there was a lack of harm to any "person or group of
persons," and arguing that the "Article III questions about judicial authority are ...
[not answered by] the Court's attempted distinction between Miller and United States
v. Hays"); David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative Redistricting
Cases-Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1123,
1140 (1997) (positing that where the majority enacts legislation that allegedly harms
members of the majority group a majority plaintiff suffers no "constitutionally cognizable injury"); Karlan, All Over the Map, supra note 56, at 278 (taking issue with the
Shaw Court's "complete disregard" for standing doctrine and asking what injury
gave plaintiffs standing to bring suit); Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial
Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REv. 1, 9 (1995) (stating that the
Shaw plaintiffs lacked elements considered essential to establish a valid Equal Protection claim).
107. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the PostShaw Era, 26 CuMB. L. REv. 287, 294-295 (1995-1996) [hereinafter Karlan, Still Hazy]
(finding all three prongs of standing problematic as applied to the voting rights
cases).
108. See id. at 293-294. There could be an injury, according to Karlan, only if the
Court was prepared to define a cognizable injury in the districting context as "racial
integration where Whites do not remain the predominant group." Id. at 293.
109. See id. at 294. See also Parker, supra note 106, at 18-20 (arguing that plaintiffs
cannot show a link between the districting and the likelihood that elected candidates
would represent only members of one race or that the districting exacerbates racial
voting; nor could they demonstrate redressability because voters and candidates
who might be elected from the challenged districts are not before the court).
110. See, e.g., James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting
Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 How. L.J. 633, 634 (1996) (criticizing the Court for allowing gerrymandering on the basis of a panoply of reasons, but singling out and
striking down race as a reason); Karlan, All Over the Map, supra note 56, at 278
(taking issue with the Shaw Court's "complete disregard" for standing doctrine and
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government that obeys the law,"' should have been, by definition,
insufficient for standing in the Equal Protection context as the Court
had previously reserved such broad standing only for Establishment
Clause cases."' The vague, possibly widespread nature of the stated
injury seemed to be a signature example of a generalized grievance.
Moreover, if one of the reasons that a generalized grievance
should not be heard is that such matters were best left to the political
process, surely this applied to a Shaw claim-an injury that was
"political in the truest sense of the word."" 3 There was, or should
have been, a political solution available to race-conscious districting,
particularly where those objecting to the districting were of the same
race as a majority of the voters in the state and of a majority of the
state legislature."4 Indeed, Justice Stevens proposed a straightforward solution for the discontented potential Shaw plaintiffs: the

asking what injury gave plaintiffs standing to bring suit); Karlan, Our Separatism,
supra note 77, at 90-102 (castigating Court for being both "incoherent and doctrinally
unstable," and using inflammatory arguments to avoid discussing the real issues of
whether non-White voters have a voice in the political process); Parker, supra note
106, at 9(stating that plaintiffs in Shaw lacked elements considered essential to establish a valid Equal Protection claim because they made no claim of being injured by
virtue of discrimination against a protected, identifiable class); Melissa L. Saunders,
Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REv. 245, 324-326
(1997) (arguing that the Shaw cases represent a departure from traditional equal
protection concerns, i.e., state action that has the effect of singling out certain persons
or groups for special benefits or burdens without sufficient justification). But see,
Katherine Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L.
REV. 313, 324, 340-41 (1995-96) (seeing lack of standing as no defense to a racial
gerrymander claim and implying that racial classification is harmful in any context).
111. See Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 107, at 297 (noting that a "candid [C]ourt"
might well have held it acceptable to sue to enforce the right to a government that
obeys the Constitution).
112. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. 889, 923 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have
permitted generalized claims of harm resulting from state sponsored messages to
secure standing under the Establishment Clause"). Further, a broadly framed prohibition against governmental classification of individuals by race, taken literally,
would render government census activities illegal. See id. at 925-926 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J.Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1201, 1214 (1996) (noting that if it is the mere use of race that is the injury "a
wide range of government activities--from juror collection questionnaires to police
descriptions of fleeing suspects to much of the census-may also be presumptively
unconstitutional.").
113. Dow, supra note 106, at 1146; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 220, 227 (1974) ("Our system of government leaves many
crucial decisions to the political processes.") (citing United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 179 (1974)).
114. See Dow, supra note 106, at 1132-33. For Dow, the pertinent question is
"whether it is coherent to allow a member of a political majority to raise a constitutional challenge to action undertaken by the majority of which she is a member." Id.
He argues that the Court's undue focus on the standard of review post-Bakke has
obscured this more important question. See id.
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election of a legislature that would refuse to draft a race-conscious
districting plan."- Similarly, Professor David Dow has proposed that
where Whites are a "governing majority" they should lack standing
to challenge legislative decisions that aim to and succeed in
strengthening the political power of nonmajority groups.
2. Individualizing the Injury
Initially, the Court ignored the standing issue entirely." 7 However, in subsequent cases, the Court strove to transform the Shaw
injury into one that is congruent with its standing doctrine. The
allusion to harms as potentially stigmatizing, balkanizing, and
stereotyping

8

were of little help in particularizing and individual-

izing the injury.
One way to remove standing as an obstacle to hearing a case is
to characterize the injury so that it fits within established parameters. Commentators have long critiqued the Court's practice in this
regard, for it is in the very act of recharacterization that standing is
most easily manipulated, since the characterization of an injury is
emphatically a non-neutral judgment."9 But how could a Shaw plaintiff show that she had been "singled out"' 20 at all, much less on the
basis of race? An assumption that voters are treated as "individuals"
in a process that is designed to group people is questionable at best.
115. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1013 n. 9 (1996) (Stevens, J.,dissenting)
(pointing out that use of the democratic process could "alleviate [plaintiffs'] injury").
116. Dow, supra note 106, at 1145-1148. Dow also argues that as a substantive
matter, such a rule would be consistent with a functional view of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, if a prime function of the Constitution is to allow Courts to
intercede where a majority has acted to harm a minority, such a rule would effectuate this intended beneficiary concept. Id. at 1127.
117. In Shaw I, the Court gave little credence to consideration of whether plaintiffs
had standing to bring their claim. Indeed, the very word "standing" does not appear
anywhere in either the majority or dissenting opinions. Only Justice White mentioned that plaintiffs had not "alleged a cognizable injury." 509 U.S. 630, 659 (1993)
(White, J.,
dissenting).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71 (summarizing Shaw I).
119. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 28, at 231 (arguing that "injury in fact" requirement cannot be applied in a non-normative way); Gene R. Nichol, Rethinking
Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 81-82 (1984) ("[D]etermination of which injuries may
properly trigger the federal judicial power is hardly a neutral, value-free process.").
120. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997) (denying standing to Members of
Congress alleging that a provision in the Line Item Veto Act violated Art. I of the
Constitution on the ground that plaintiffs "have not been singled out for specially
unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies"). The
Court went on to state that plaintiffs had not claimed that they have been deprived
of something to which they personally are entitled .. .[rlather, [their] claim of standing is based on a loss of political power, not loss of any private right, which would
make the injury more concrete." Id.
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Shaw plaintiffs would likely be unable to show that they had been
placed in a particular district because of their race, as opposed to
being placed there for other, non-racial reasons.12 1 One non-racial
reason might be to ensure that the districts were equally populated.'" The persons so added to a district have been termed "filler
people," 12 to indicate that they are chosen not for their potential to
aid the electoral control exercised by any particular group, but
rather to round out the district's total population. Countering this
proposition is the argument set forth by John Hart Ely, that filler
people are put in Shaw districts because of their race, since they must
belong to any group other than the racial or ethnic minority that is in
the majority in the district. Under this latter view, the injury may
be seen as clear: the intentional assignment of a voter to a district
where her vote won't count. The filler people so assigned have
standing as individuals who have been disadvantaged because of
race.lu Indeed, for Ely the disadvantage suffered by such constituents goes beyond being represented by someone who ignores their
interests. He goes further to attest that "[wihite filler people have
standing basically because they've been deprived of a meaningful
shot at helping to elect a representative whose race .is
the same as
theirs."'26 While that formulation of injury might be read into the
Shaw claim as subtext, it is not one that the Court itself recognized. 7
The Court seizes upon the potential injury it saw posed by the
message sent to the elected official in a racially gerrymandered district in United States v. Haysi'2 In Hays, decided two years after Shaw

121. As the Court recognizes, "[diemonstrating the individualized harm ...
[might] not be easy in the racial gerrymandering context." United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 744 (1995).
122. See discussion of the one-person, one-vote requirement infra Part III.B.1.
123. This is the term used in Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 81, at 630-633
(noting that filler people may actually feel harmed because they are "essentialized"
by a race-conscious districting plan and thus "denied their dignitary right to equal
treatment and respect by having their welfare discounted"). See also Abigail Themstrom, More Notes From A Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911, 917 (1995) (regarding
the White voters in a majority-minority district as being "included so as not to waste
Black ballots by excessive 'packing' ").
124. See John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-MinorityGerrymanders, 111 HARv.
L. REV. 576, 581-85 (1997).
125. See id. at 585, 594-95.
126. Id. at 594.
127. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstandingin
Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV.L. REV. 2276, 2290-2291 (1998) (pointing out that not
only is Professor Ely's view of the injury not how the Court itself described it, but
that it would fly in the face of much of the Court's language and be more restrictive,
since his position would mean that only those persons who are of a minority population in a district can sue).
128. 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995).
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I, the Court was forced to confront the standing issue because defendants had raised the issue below, and the district court, with little
discussion, had found standing. 2 9 Due to significant alteration of the
districting plan following the Shaw I decision, the plaintiffs no
longer resided in the newly created majority-minority congressional
district. Since the district court had not addressed the standing issue
in the context of the revised plan, the Supreme Court did.
The Court acknowledged that the "rule against generalized
grievances applie[d] with as much force in the Equal Protection
context."'3 ° Because of the need for a plaintiff to be "personally denied equal treatment," the Court rejected the suggestion that all State
residents would have standing to sue. 3' As a way of accommodating
the Shaw claim within its standing jurisprudence, and presumably to
take care of the problem of a potentially unlimited universe of plaintiffs, the Court held that only residents of the challenged district
may bring suit. Reviewing the catalogue of potential harms recited
in Shaw I, the Court concluded that the harm is a "representational"
one, and only voters in those districts night suffer these "special
representational harms.' '32 Only residents will have been denied
equal treatment because of the reliance on racial criteria. Plaintiffs
not residing in the district may sue only if they are able to make an
showing that they have been "personally classified by
evidentiary
,, 1
race. 3
Perhaps in recognition of the problem that the Shaw claim creates-a claim that at best may be limited to residents of the Statethe Court in Hays chose to distinguish between those who live in the
majority-minority district and those who live outside it. Even this
distinction, however, left the injury unclear,TM and some commenta-

129. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, (W.D. La. 1993). Correcting what it
saw as defendants' "belie[f] that only historically disadvantaged minorities have
standing to attack state laws that segregate citizens on the basis of race[,]" the district
court in Hays did not engage in any real analysis of standing law. Id. at 1192. It
simply held that "[w]hite citizens thus clearly have standing to challenge redistricting plans under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, just as
do... citizens of any other race." Id.
130. Hays, 515 U.S. at 743.
131. Id. at 744.
132. See id. at 745.

133.

Id.

134. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 76, at 63-64 (criticizing the Court
for its continued failure to announce a coherent theory of standing, since it is difficult
to distinguish between the harm suffered by a person on one side of a district line
and that suffered by a person on the other, unless the first harm is being represented
by an African American elected official, and that the Hays restriction misses the fact
").
that in districting "a decision to include.., is... also a decision to exclude ....
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135

tors saw this distinction as specious. In its effort to give contour to
Shaw standing, the Court had failed to tell us why a voter on one
side of a district line was injured, while a voter on the other side of
the line was not.'36 Indeed, the Hays plaintiffs themselves, none of
whom resided in either of Louisiana's majority-minority districts,
objected to the Court's137limitation, noting that their complaint challenged the entire plan.
3. No Proof of Injury
Even if one accepts the Hays articulation of injury as sufficient,
there is still a final aspect of Shaw standing that does not make sense.
At some point in the litigation, a plaintiff is expected to demonstrate
that the putative injury has actually occurred or is likely to do so.'"
For example, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,"39 plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants had injured them by denying them the
right to seek housing of their own choice and live in an integrated
neighborhood, as well as damaging the housing market, when they
"steered" potential African American home owners into a "target
area." 4° The Court recognized the injury of the plaintiffs living in the
"target area," as well as the Village itself, yet specified that the plaintiffs would need to show on remand that "as alleged, petitioner's
sales practices actually
have begun to rob Bellwood of its racial bal4
ance and stability.",

1

135. See Blacksher, Majority Black Districts, supra note 106, at 450 ("Article III
questions about judicial authority are raised, which the Court's attempted distinction
between Miller and United States v. Hays (voters who live in the challenged district
have standing, while those outside the district do not) failed to answer." See also
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 127, at 2276-2277 (arguing that instead of limiting
the number of potential plaintiffs, the Court actually expanded the pool of potential
plaintiffs). But cf. Saunders, supra note 110, at 321 (noting that Hays may not be as
arbitrary as some suggest and that residence is used merely as an evidentiary presumption).
136. If the purported injury is the message sent by the state that race matters,
residents of adjacent districts are in the same position. Distinguishing between them
put the Court in the same position as it says the State actors are in. That is, engaging
in demeaning stereotyping, by assuming that residents of the fourth district in Louisiana were harmed in ways that those in the fifth district were not. See Durchslag,
supra note 62, at 353-54.
137. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 746.
138. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, § 2.3, at 58.
139. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
140. Id. at 95.
141. Id. at 111 (emphasis added). See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 101 (1983) (denying standing for purposes of injunctive relief to a plaintiff who
had been subjected to a chokehold during a routine traffic stop by the LAPD because
he could not show that he would have had another encounter with the police or that
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In examinign the issue of putative injury, the Shaw Court has
apparently decided that an injury to White voters residing in a majority-minority district, bizarrely shaped or not, may be presumed.
But while a federal court is now required to presume that White
voters in an integrated Shaw district have suffered a representational
harm, legislators may not presume that the African American voters
in the district are likely to vote Democratic, lest they be accused of
using "race as a proxy.'14
Evidently, the analytical distinctiveness of the Shaw claimmere creation of a district based predominantly on race-was to be
carried over to normal evidentiary requirements as well. If the
pruported injury is that the quality of representation for the White
voter has suffered, a plaintiff should be required to come forward
with proof that this has actually occurred. On the other hand, if the
injury is that the plaintiff simply has reason to doubt the quality of
her representation,' even if the quality never actually suffers, it is
unlikely that one would ever be able to provide tangible evidence of
this perceived harm. Undoubtedly this difficulty is attributable to
the court's recognition of what have been termed "expressive
harms."144 Thus it suffices for a court to rely on a presumption of
injury, even if based on no more than the mere statement of injured
feelings sufficed by the voter because of the racial message sent by
the state.'4 While plaintiffs might well prove that a "representational
harm" has occurred, 146 no plaintiff was ever required to do so.

all police officers engaged in the same conduct); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501502 (1975) (holding that trial court has authority to require plaintiff to proffer facts
that would support standing or suffer dismissal of the complaint). Cf.Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (relying on Bellwood to hold that equal
housing opportunity organization would have standing to sue realty company
accused of discrimination if "as broadly alleged, petitioners' steering practices have
perceptibly impaired [their] ability to provide counseling and referral services for
low and moderate-income homeseekers [because] there can be no question that the
organization has suffered injury in fact") (emphasis added).
142. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968-69 (1996) (noting that it is acceptable to
achieve partisan goals even where these have "racial implications," but where race is
used as a proxy for political affiliations, a "racial stereotype... is in operation"). This
was true, according to the Court, despite evidence that 97% of African American
voters in and around Dallas vote Democratic. See also id. at 998 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (finding that "shift[ing] blocs of African American voters to districts of
incumbent Democrats" constituted use of race as a proxy).
143. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 424 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
144. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno,
92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 485 (1993) (viewing Shaw as resting on a "distinctive conception
of the kinds of harms against which the Constitution protects ... [called] expressive
harms, as opposed to more familiar, material harms").
145. Cf.Fletcher, supra note 28, at 231 (noting that "[t]here cannot be a merely
factual determination whether a plaintiff has been injured except in the relatively
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The incoherence of the Court's identification of the injury, even
with the Hays gloss coupled with the apparent lack of a requirement
that plaintiffs prove any actual injury, left the district court on the
remand of Shaw struggling to apply Shaw I and the subsequent decisions. The district court noted that "[alt first blush, it would appear
that plaintiffs have not alleged, much less proved the sort of 'injury
in fact required'" by standing law. The district court concludedcorrectly as it turned out-that the Supreme Court would find
standing, despite the "abstract, theoretical, and merely speculative
nature of the harms alleged."''1 The district court based this conclusion on its understanding that the Supreme Court had imposed the
"liberal rule of standing developed in [Regents of California v. Bakke]"
and other affirmative action decisions.
The Court's refusal to mandate that plaintiffs raising a Shaw
challenge to majority-minority districts actually prove the existence
of any harm may be contrasted with the proof required in making
out an Equal Protection claim and of African American and Hispanic
plaintiffs claiming racial vote dilution. The Court had held that such
plaintiffs must make a tri-partite threshold showing in Thornburgh v.
Gingles.50 First, plaintiffs must show that the minority population is
trivial sense of determining whether the plaintiff is telling the truth about her sense
of injury").
146. A plaintiff might show "first, [that] all or most Black voters support the same
candidate, and, second, [that] the successful candidate ignore[d] the interests of her
White constituents." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 930 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Shaw, 861 F. Supp. at 424.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 425. But the district court recognized the difficulty with even this formulation:
It is not.., obvious how this liberal rule of standing... challenging
explicit racial classifications can be transposed to race-based districting[, since] ... the cases in which the dignitary injury resulting
from a racial classification has been found sufficient to confer Article
III standing have involved the use of race to disadvantage members
of a particular racial group relative to other persons in the distribution of some governmental benefit.
Id. See also Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 76, at 56 (noting that prior to Shaw, the
Court had never struck down legislation without also identifying an injury); Pamela
S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1705,
1735 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan, Pessimism About Formalism] (explaining how the
lower court in Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) h.ad essentially "Crosonized"
the reapportionment process, by requiring that the drawing of "race-conscious 'safe
districting"' be restricted to those situations when the failure to do so would itself
violate the Voting Rights Act).
150. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993)
("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a
remedy."); Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 158 (holding that the Gingles preconditions apply
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sufficiently large and geographically compact to make up a majority
in a single-member district.'51 Second, plaintiffs must show that the
minority population is politically cohesive.' Third, and crucial to
their case, they must demonstrate the existence of racial bloc voting;
a court may not presume its existence.5 3
In none of the Shaw-type cases had plaintiffs offered any evidence whatsoever that any of the purported harms articulated by the
Court had occurred or that they would occur. If the harm was the
potential for an increase in racial bloc voting, to meet their burden
under Shaw I, plaintiffs would have to offer evidence that a challenged districting plan had increased the level of bloc voting.' 5 Were
plaintiffs in these cases to show that the representative elected from
the majority-minority district actually "received" and acted on the
particular "message" conveyed by a race-conscious district,' the
plaintiffs might meet their burden of proof by showing that the representative ignored White voters in the district or failed to provide
constituent services in an even-handed manner, thus showing a
representational harm. The plaintiffs in these cases neither introduced nor claimed to have any evidence of specific injury.
Notwithstanding these difficulties with such a claim by the end of

and should be followed, but that they "cannot be applied mechanically without
regard to the nature of the claim"). The Court in Shaw I reaffirms that "racial bloc
voting and minority-group political cohesion never can be assumed, but specifically
must be proved in each case in order to establish" a § 2 violation." Shaw 1, 509 U.S.
630, 653 (1993).
151. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
152. Where the intraracial voting results also show support for identical candidates and/or issues, cohesiveness is shown. See id. at 56.
153. See id. at 51. Proof that minority voters vote for minority candidates and nonminority voters for non-minority candidates will be sufficient to prove racial bloc
voting. The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the existence of racial bloc
voting in a particular state or locality cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated
through the introduction of probative and persuasive evidence. See Growe, 507 U.S. at
42; Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 151; see also Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 653 (reaffirming principle
that "racial bloc voting and minority-group political cohesion never can be assumed,
but specifically must be proved in each case in order to establish a § 2 violation")
(citing Growe).
154. Proof of racial bloc voting is invariably based on evidence of the results in a
series of elections over a number of years. In Gingles, for example, the plaintiffs
introduced detailed evidence regarding the voting behavior of Blacks and Whites in
six elections over the course of twelve years. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 32. In Shaw I,
plaintiffs acknowledged that racial bloc voting by both Blacks and Whites existed to
a substantial degree even before the enactment of the legislation at issue. See Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant-Interviewers' First Set of Written Interrogatories, Shaw
v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1992) (No. CIVA92-202-CIV-5BR).
155. See Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 648.
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the Court's 1996 term, it was ensconced in voting rights jurisprudence.'
As a result of the Shaw line of cases, a resident who showed that
race was the predominant factor motivating the creation of her district could now make out a prima facie case of an equal protection
violation, without showing any specific injury. White plaintiffs are
presumptively injured when a democratically elected body takes
race into account when drawing electoral districts to enable minority
groups to participate in the political process and elect candidates of
their choice. 5 7 The Court disregarded traditional standing principles
156. The Court has now sustained several challenges to majority Black districts.
See Silver v. Diaz, 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997) (mem.), aff'g 978 F. Supp. 96, 117 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs based on district's odd
shape, direct evidence that all districting criteria with exception of equal population
were subordinated to racial concerns, and where the district was not shown to be
narrowly tailored to meet concerns of § 2 or § 5); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74
(1997) (upholding district court's redistricting plan on remand of Miller that included
only one African American majority district instead of the two majority-Black districts previously adopted by the Georgia state legislature); Moon v. Meadows, 521
U.S. 1113 (1997) (mem.), aff'g 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1997) (rejecting state's
assertion that a minority congressional district was created to avoid a possible § 2
violation, where the district was not compact, not drawn in the area of a potential
violation, and where there was insufficient evidence of the existence of a compact
minority population and racial bloc voting); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 918 (reversing district court's decision that minority districts were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest).
But the Supreme Court has summarily affirmed, without opinion, several
lower court decisions approving race-conscious congressional and legislative plans.
See King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 118 S. Ct. 877 (1998) (mem.), aff'g 979 F. Supp.
619 (N.D. 111.1997) (affirming approval of creation of race-conscious African American majority districts which avoided harm to potential Hispanic district where the
district court found a compelling interest in remedying potential violations of § 2,
concluding that the districts were narrowly tailored and that race was considered no
more than reasonably necessary to fulfill its remedial purpose); Quilter v. Voinovich,
118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998) (mem.), affg 981 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (affirming
lower court's approval of districts despite finding that race was a substantial factor
but one that fit within traditional districting principles); DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S.
1170 (1995) (mem.), aff'g 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding the
deliberate creation of compact minority districts by court-appointed special masters).
In Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997), the Court affirmed the district
court's rejection of a challenge to a legislative redistricting settlement in Florida that
reduced the Black voting age population from 45% to 36% in a state senate district. In
Hunt v. Cromartie,119 S. Ct. 1545 (1999), the Court reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment for plaintiffs who had brought yet another challenge to the
constitutionality of North Carolina's District 12. While the Court viewed plaintiffs'
circumstantial evidence as permitting an inference of racial motive, evidence of a
"high correlation between race and party preference" precluded summary judgment
on the disputed issue of the State's intent. Id. at *6.
157. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for "nisapply[ing] the term 'gerrymander' ... to condemn the
efforts of a majority (Whites) to share its power with a minority (African Americans)").
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when it embarked on a path that might very well make all majorityminority districts constitutionally suspect, based largely on presuming injury to (White) voters by virtue of their mere residence in a
majority-minority district. By sheer dint of will rather than logic and
reasoning based on precedent, the Court succeeded in individualizing what began as a claim of a right to a color-blind electoral process
and ended as a claim of the right of a voter to be individually placed
in a district, lest she be "classified" on the basis of race and suffer aperceived and unproven-representational injury.
II. WHY SHAW DOES MAKE SENSE
Shaw standing and the confusion it engenders are symptomatic
of a deeper problem: the Court has simply failed to articulate a coherent theory of the meaning of the right to vote. The Court's
departure from established tenets of law reveals the Court's failure
to address what should be its real concern in voting rights cases:
whether non-White voters have a voice in the political process and
consequently in the shaping of legislative policies.'
The results in the Shaw cases owe much to the views of the individual justices about democracy and voting. This section surveys
the views of the right to vote expressed by currently sitting justices. I
conclude that under the views of the Shaw majority, standing makes
sense because the Court is able to view the right to vote as little more
than an individual right to cast a ballot that is equally weighted and
counted. The Court ignores aspects of the right to vote that involve
group rights, particularly the right to influence the political process
and to be actually represented.'59
158. See Karlan, Our Separatism, supra note 77, at 84, 92.
159. Professor Pamela Karlan provides a useful taxonomy of voting which may be
helpful in consideration of the views of the sitting justices on the Court. Karlan
envisions a taxonomy of voting that includes three different rights-participation,
aggregation, and governance. See Karlan, Pessimism About Formalism, supra note 149,
at 1707-19; see also infra note 173 and accompanying text (describing the first generation cases under the Voting Rights Act). The first right is, in many ways, symbolic;
participation claims are protestations about gaining membership in a political community. These claims are primarily individual, involving challenges to barriers to
full "civic inclusion." See Karlan, Pessimism About Formalism, supra note 149, at 1710
(defining civic inclusion as "a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal
political dignity; greater readiness to acquiesce in governmental decisions; and hence
broader consent and legitimacy"). Claims involving the second right-aggregationare pressed by groups of citizens challenging electoral boundaries (such as gerrymandering) or structural rules within an election (such as majority-vote runoff
requirements which might operate to favor a candidate who receives fewer popular
votes than his opponent). See id. at 1713-14. Karlan's third concept is that of voting
as governance, enabling a voter to engage in a continuing dialogue within the democratic process. Within this framework, a voter's concern is seen as transcending the
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Before addressing the differences among the views of the sitting
justices, it is important to note the commonalities among their views.
Justice Ginsburg has identified four areas of agreement among the
justices regarding the districting cases. 16° In general, the justices
agree that these cases implicate federalism concerns, and the varied
opinions express considerable sentiment against judicial intervention in what is essentially a political process.' The two groups of
justices diverge, however, on the circumstances under which it is
permissible for the judiciary to interfere with the state's choices in

selection of one person at an election, in order to embrace concerns about the makeup and direction of the legislative body as a whole. See id. at 1716-18.
According to one scholar, the Court has consistently been most receptive to
claims falling within the participation category. See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the
Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 893, 901-902, 906-907 (1997) (distinguishing between
claims about protective democracy, which involve the notion of the right to vote as
basic and preservative of other rights, and communitarian democracy, embodying
issues of political inclusion, and arguing that the Court has shown consistent hostility to the former and preference for the latter). The Court has been least receptive to
claims within Karlan's governance category. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (denying Black county commissioners' claim that
respective counties had violated § 5 of Voting Rights Act by failing to obtain preclearance for either resolution altering prior practice of allowing each commissioner
full authority to determine how to spend funds allocated to his own road district or
for unit system abolishing individual road districts and transferring responsibility
for all road operations to county engineer appointed by commission).
The Court's willingness to consider claims within the aggregation branch of
the right to vote has been mixed, depending on whether such a claim is made pursuant to the constitution or the Voting Rights Act. Such claims fared most successfully
under the 1982 amendments to the Act, which made clear that dilution claims could
be proven through an effects test. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). See also Karlan,
Pessimism About Formalism, supra note 149, at 1715 (noting that a focus on the racial
aspect of racial vote dilution claims-rather than on the fundamental right aspect of
voting-led the Court to rely on general equal protection doctrine in deciding these
claims, with the result that the Court would invalidate a practice only when it was
shown that the practice was developed or maintained with a specific purpose of
diluting minority votes).
160. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934-936 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(seeing Court agreement on: 1) recognition of presumed state competence in the area
of districting, 2) the historical exclusion from the franchise of Black citizens, and 3)
the fact that states may consider race in the context of a statutory command, or 4) in
order to recognize communities of interest).
161. Members of both the majority and the dissent acknowledge the federalism
concerns arising from interference by a federal court in the highly political business
that is the duty of state government, whose competence in this arena should ordinarily not be questioned. Compare, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 936 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) with id. at 915 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (reapportionment primarily the duty and responsibility of the state); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996)
(O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (stating that the courts opinion "reemphasize[s] the
importance of the State's discretion in the redistricting process") with id. at 1037-38
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (cautioning against interference in the redistricting process).
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districting. For the Shaw majority, such interference is justified
when there is an excessive and overt use of race in districting, regardless of whether there is any impact on the ability of any
individual to vote or whether the complaining party is able to show
group vote dilution.' By contrast, the Shaw dissenters 6 would defer
to the legislature when its actions reflect a desire to enhance the
definable minority groups to participate in the political
ability of
165
process.
In examining these diverging views of the Court, I look to the
opinions of the current sitting justices, with a particular focus on
Justices O'Connor and Stevens. 6 6 One view, represented by the Shaw
majority, adopts a formalistic view of voting, which may be termed
"outcome-indifferent.' The Shaw dissenters, by contrast, endorse a
functional view, one that is "outcome-regarding."
Those on the Court in the first group, including Justices Thomas, Kennedy, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see the right to
vote as primarily, if not solely, an individual participatory right. The
justices comprising the Shaw majority tend to infuse the political
infrastructure with talismanic authority, elevating it over voting
itself, which remains a formalistic individual act accompanying
elections and related activity. 167 Voting under this view is divorced
from the outcome of elections and does not link the voter to the
political process or decisionmaking. In the end, these justices perceive voting as a right to be exercised by individuals in the
abstract.9' A member of the Shaw majority, Justice O'Connor would
T

162. By this designation, I refer to Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence, with her
own majority opinion in Vera, may indicate a belated realization on her part that the
pendulum has swung too far. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 993.
163. See infra Part II.A.
164. While the dissenters in Shaw I included Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter, with regard to the current sitting justices, this category includes Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter. Justices Ginburg and Breyer, appointed by
President Clinton to replace Justices White and Blackmun, respectively, did not join
the Court until after Shaw I was decided. Justice Ginsburg has been a vocal dissenter
in the post-Shaw cases, and her views are discussed in this section rather than those
of Justice White, although there is an area of agreement between these two justices
on the issue of voting rights. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 946, n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(indicating agreement with opinion written by Justice White in UJO).
165. See infra Part lI.B.
166. I do not separately address the views of Chief Justice Rehnquist, or Justices
Scalia, Souter and Breyer, insofar as their views parallel those other justices whose
views are discussed herein.
167. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Relationships or Representation in Voting Rights Act
Jurisprudence, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1993) (criticizing the Court's decision in
Presley for the majority's "tendency to see a single event [an election] as the culmination of political participation and the focus of voting rights efforts").
168. See infra Part II.A.1.
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also more readily take cognizance of voting as an individual right.
However, she alone among the Shaw majority is willing to acknowledge that voting may also implicate group rights. 6 9
At the other end of the spectrum are those justices who share a
functional view of voting, a view which involves a concern about the
electoral process but is also broad enough to embrace a concern for
the post-electoral influence of voters. These justices would entertain
governance claims and would treat claims about race-conscious
districting as being about aggregation-group, not just individual,
claims about voting. Justice Stevens leads this group of justices,
which includes Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, in keeping
with his vision of the importance of voting as representation, which
necessarily includes a notion of group rights.
I turn now to more specific treatment of the prevailing voting
rights theories among the justices.
A. The FormalisticView: The Shaw Majority
1. Voting as Ballot Access and Individual Rights
Of the sitting Justices, Justices Thomas and Scalia espouse quite
possibly the most narrow view on voting. This is best illustrated by
their expressed views on the Voting Rights Act. For these two justices, the only proper interpretation of the Act is the most literal one,
which does not acknowledge the Act's larger goal of enabling minorities to particpate in the politcal process and elect candidates of
choice. Thus, the right to vote is limited to the right to cast a ballot
and have it counted.
These views are best expressed in a concurring opinion in
Holder v. Hall,"' where Justice Thomas proposed that the Court engage in "a systematic reassessment of our interpretation of § 2.''
The Holder plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Bleckley County,
Georgia had adopted and maintained a single-commissioner form of
government in order to limit the political influence of Black citizens
in the County, who made up approximately 20% of the eligible voting population. 72 The Supreme Court held that claims involving the
169. See infra Part II.A.3.
170. 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 876 (claiming that the size of a governing body is not subject to challenge under § 2).
172. See id. at 876-77. Bleckley County was in the minority of counties in Georgia
using a single commissioner system; most counties had multimember commissioners. See id. at 877. In 1986, the county electorate rejected a change where it would be
governed by a multimember commission, five of whose members were elected from
single-member districts with the chair elected at large. See id. at 877. The district
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size of a governing body did not come within the purview of the
statute. While conceding that § 2 jurisprudence suggested that
claims of the Holder plaintiffs fit within the dilution model, Justice
Thomas favored limiting claims under § 2 to what have been termed
"first generation claims."7 Under this view claims about ballot access are the sum total of the purview of the Voting Rights Act.174 The
Holder claims would not be covered, and neither would "challenges
to allegedly dilutive election methods that [the Court had] considered within the scope of the Act in the past" fit within "the terms
'standard, practice, or procedure' that can be derived from the text
of the Act." 75 Justice Thomas termed the dilution cases "a disastrous

court rejected the constitutional claim because plaintiffs had failed to prove intent.
See id. at 878. It also rejected the statutory claim because plaintiffs had not satisfied
all three Gingles preconditions. See id. at 879. The district court found that the proof
supported the first Gingles precondition that the Black population was compact and
substantial enough to make up a majority of one district, but that the evidence did
not show racial bloc voting and political cohesiveness of the Black population. See id.
at 878-79. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that all three preconditions had
been met. See id. at 879.
173. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093
n.75 (1991) (defining first generation cases as those focusing on the individual right
to participate). Such claims would include overt disenfranchisement and challenges
to voter registration barriers or impediments to exercise of the franchise. See, e.g.,
Gain v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking grandfather clauses which excluded Black voters); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating White
primaries from which Black voters were excluded); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (striking literacy tests); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking poll taxes).
Second generation claims focus on minority vote dilution. See Guinier, supra,
at 1093-94. Such dilution might be accomplished, for example, by the use of at-large
districts in which a minority group may be submerged in the population or by arbitrarily splitting or "packing" a group of cohesive African American voters, thereby
limiting that group's electoral power. See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand
Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORrTY VOTE DILUrION 85, 86-99 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describing racial gerrymandering techniques). An extreme example
that is presented by Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), where the City of
Tuskeegee redrew its boundaries to exclude virtually all Black voters.
Finally, third generation claims are those directed toward gerrymandering
from within a legislative body. See Guinier, supra, at 1127; see also Presley v. Etowah
County, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (rejecting challenge under Voting Rights Act to reduction
in power of elected commissioners after election of first Black commissioner).
174. Justice Thomas views § 2 as encompassing "only state enactments that limit
citizens' access to the ballot." Holder, 512 U.S. at 893 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring)
(agreeing with majority that the size of a governing body was not subject to statutory
challenge).
dissent175. Id. But cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 407-10 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
ing) (pointing out that, § 2, as interpreted in Gingles, encompasses two separate types
of claims: 1) a non-dilution participatory claim, including claims of denial of right to
vote, i.e., racial discrimination in voter registration, 2) and an electoral claim, i.e.,
vote dilution). See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) ("A violation ...is established if
[members of a protected class] have less opportunity than other members of the
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misadventure in judicial policymaking," that have "immersed the
federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political
theory.. ." and had "encourage[d] federal courts to segregate voters
into racially designated districts to ensure minority electoral success." 176 Subscribing to language from Shaw I, Justice Thomas saw the
Court as having "collaborated in what may aptly be term[ed] the
racial 'balkaniz[ation]' of the Nation." 177
Under Justice Thomas' view, application of the Act to dilution
claims converted the Act into:
a device for regulating, rationing, and apportioning
political power among racial and ethnic groups. In
the process, we have read the Act essentially as a
grant of authority to the federal judiciary to develop
theories on basic principles of representative government, for it is only a resort to political theory that
can enable a court to determine which electoral systems provide the "fairest" levels of representation or
the most "effective" or "undiluted" votes to minorities.1 78
In one sense, Justice Thomas was right. By virtue of the shameful
exclusion of Black citizens from the right to vote, perpetrated and
maintained by the very political entities Justice Thomas believes the
courts have usurped, the judiciary was being called upon to "select[]
..a theory for defining the fully 'effective' vote at bottom, a theory
for defining effective participation in representative government." 179

electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.").
176. Holder, 512 U.S. at 892 (Thomas, J., concurring)
177. Id. See also Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 657 (1993).
178. Holder, 512 U.S. at 893 (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 897. Justice Thomas is critical of the preference for single-member
districts both as a "benchmark" by which to measure dilution and as a remedial
mechanism for curing the dilution resulting from at-large or multimember districts,
seeing this, too, as a political choice. See Id. at 898-99 (referring to Justice Harlan's
question in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 (1991), of "whether a
group's votes should be considered to be more 'effective' when they provide influence over a greater number of seats, or control over a lesser number of seats"). Cf.
Pamela S. Karlan, Maps & Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 175 (1989) [hereinafter Karlan, Maps & Misreadings] (stating that "the history of constitutional protections
against racial vote dilution" reflects a commitment to a broader measure of political
access and civic inclusion). See also Holder, 512 U.S. at 900 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
(noting that a better "theory of effective political participation [might be one] that
would accord greater importance to voters' ability to influence, rather than control,
elections... especially in a two-party system such as ours, [where] the influence of a
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The problem is that the Court has failed to promulgate any coherent
theory; yet the Shaw cases raise the question of whether the Court
will allow the states to do so.
For Justice Thomas, although there are "an infinite number of
theories of effective suffrage, representation, and the proper apportionment of political power,"'w an "effective" vote is simply one that
is "duly cast and counted."'' Justice Thomas' reading of the statutory language of the Voting Rights Act 18 2 led him to conclude that
the "most natural reading" of § 2(b) is the "opportunity ... to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice," is a formalistic one.' An unimpeded opportunity to register
to vote and cast a ballot suffices. The problem for Justice Thomas
with an interpretation which includes claims of dilution-an interpretation he concedes is entirely plausible-is that it requires courts
to engage in political theorizing, choosing from a "dizzying array of
concepts of political equality." Another difficulty for Justice Thomas is the tension between a focus on electoral outcomes and the
statutory disclaimer of an entitlement to proportional representation. 1s6 This tension arises from the use of a hypothetical sort of

potential 'swing' group of voters composing 10% to 20% of the electorate in a given
district can be considerable") (citation omitted).
180. For example, Justice Thomas refers to proportional representation, the creation of "influence districts," and the Bandemer concept of "virtual representation," or
the simplest solution of merely accepting that, in a majoritarian system, minorities
frequently lose. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 900-01 nn.7-9. Influence districts, those with
more than 35% minority population, may still not translate into political fairness
where voting is racially polarized. See LANi GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 8690 (1994).
181. Holder, 512 U.S. at 901 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I do not pretend to have
provided the most sophisticated account of the various possibilities; but such matters
of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judges.").
182. See id. at 918-19 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing §§ 2 and 14(b) of the
Act). The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act did not alter Justice Thomas'
views. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 55 (1980), the Court held that the Voting Rights Act did no more than codify the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition of
"denial or abridgement of the right to vote," requiring plaintiffs to show intent to
prove a statutory violation. One of the stated goals of the 1982 amendment to the Act
was to overrule this decision. See Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1347, 1348 (1983). But for Justice Thomas, a corollary of this fact was that there was
no corresponding indication that Congress intended to alter the "understanding that
§ 2 protects a concept of the 'right to vote' that does not extend to prohibit vote
dilution, for] it likely would have addressed that aspect of Bolden explicitly as well."
Holder, 512 U.S. at 921 n.22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
183. See id. at 923-24; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
184. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 925 (Thomas, J., concurring).
185.

Id.

186. See id. at 927-28. The last sentence of § 2(b) states both that the Act
"provide[s]... no right to proportional representation," and that evidence of a

SPRING 19991

The Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote

proportional representation as one reliable benchmark by which to
assess a potential statutory violation. 8 7 Finally, Justice Thomas reads
the Act's preclearance provision as focusing on the individual voter
and access to the voting booth even more than § 2.1' For Justice
Thomas, the language of the statute is clear, and it is only the
Court's reliance on the Act's legislative history that has led to the
current state of affairs. 9
Justice Thomas is similarly critical of the Court's "[flar more
pernicious... willingness to accept... the assumption that the
group asserting dilution is not merely a racial or ethnic group, but a
group having distinct political interests as well."' 90 According to
Justice Thomas, requiring that plaintiffs alleging vote dilution under
the Act prove political cohesion has no mitigating effect because of
the ease of this showing.' One answer to the problems of finding a
benchmark, properly applying it, and avoiding the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts is to limit statutory claims to voter
registration and violations of one-person, one-vote. Another answer

violation might include "[t]he extent to which members of the protected class have
been elected to office." 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
187. But Justice Thomas reads the statute as removing this benchmark from
consideration:
By declaring that the section provides no right to proportional representation, § 2(b) necessarily commands that the existence or absence
of proportional electoral results should not become the deciding factor in assessing § 2 claims. But in doing so, § 2(b) removes from
consideration the most logical ratio for assessing a claim of vote dilution. To resolve a dilution claim under § 2, therefore, a court either
must arbitrarily select a different ratio to represent the "undiluted"
norm, a ratio that would have less intuitive appeal than direct proportionality, or it must effectively apply a proportionality test in
direct contravention of the text of the Act-hence the "inherent tension" between the text of the Act and vote dilution claims. Given that
§ 2 nowhere speaks in terms of "dilution," an explicit disclaimer removing from the field of play the most natural deciding principle in
dilution cases is surely a strong signal that such claims do not fall
within the ambit of the Act.
Id. at 927-28. But see Johnson v. Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (holding that
achieving proportional representation does not preclude a successful dilution claim).
188. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 930.
189. See id. at 935, (citing Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 84 (1986)).
190. Holder, 512 U.S. at 903.
191. See id. at 903-04. This showing is facilitated by judicial acceptance of a
"bivariate regression analysis.., that measures merely the correlation between race
and candidate preference and that does not directly control for other factors-to
become the norm for determining cohesion in vote dilution cases." Id. at 904 n.13. See
also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74 (stating that racially polarized voting can be shown by
finding a correlation between the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates, and causation or intent to discriminate need not be proven).
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that seems to have a certain appeal for Justice Thomas and several
commentators is to rely on alternative
voting systems, such as cu19 2
mulative or preference voting.
Justices Thomas and Scalia would subject virtually all majorityminority districts to strict scrutiny because of their joint rejection of
voting as a group right 193 and expressed distaste for claims of dilution. A majority-minority district escapes strict scrutiny only when a
majority-minority district is created "in spite of," and not "because
of," the race of its population. 194 When a district is created because of
race, "traditional race-neutral districting principles are necessarily
subordinated (and race necessarily predominates).... [t]he resulting
redistricting must be viewed as a racial gerrymander."'95 This conclusion is a logical corollary of the view expressed in affirmative
action cases that any use of race is suspect196 Justices Thomas and
Scalia would apply this standard across the entire spectrum of cases
involving the
intentional use of race by the government-including
197
districting.

192. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 909-10 nn.15-17. See also, e.g., Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in Minority Vote Dilution 249 (Chandler Davidson,
ed. 1984).
193. Notwithstanding his view that voting is limited to an individual right, Justice
Scalia has rejected the notion that specific members of a state legislature may act to
bind the legislature in settlement of litigation. See Lawyer v. Department of Justice,
520 U.S. 567, 583-90 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Lawyer, a majority of the Court
affirmed the district court's approval of a settlement of a Shaw challenge to a Florida
legislative districting, agreed to by the Speaker of the House and President of the
Senate and certain intervenors, but objected fo by plaintiff and an individual legislator. See id. at 575-80.
194. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1001 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice
Thomas disagreed with Justice O'Connor's assertion that not all majority-minority
districts should be scrutinized under Shaw standards and believed that strict scrutiny
should apply to all governmental classifications based on race. See id. at 999-1001
(Thomas, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 1001.
196. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (asserting
vigorously that all governmental racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized).
197. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 1000-02. Justices Scalia and Thomas see a perfect correlation between the districting cases and the affirmative action cases. For them strict
scrutiny is triggered whenever race is a motivation. As Justice Stevens points out, as
a practical matter, "it will be rare indeed for a State to stumble across a district in
which the minority population is both large enough and segregated enough to allow
majority-minority districts to be created with at most a 'mere awareness' that the
placement of the lines will create such a district." Id. at 1009 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 941 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the
affirmative action analogy is not appropriate for considering the constitutionality of
race-based districting).
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2. The Possibility of a Secondary and Limited Group Right
Justice Kennedy, like the others in the Shaw majority, subscribes
to an individual norm, although he accords some grudging recognition to group interests."' Nonetheless, along with Justices Thomas
and Scalia he does not acknowledge that racial or ethnic groups
could be one of those interest groups: "redistricting usually implicates a political calculus in which various interests compete for
recognition, but it does not follow that individuals of the same race
share a single political interest. " 9 Thus, the use of race to make a
districting decision becomes the use of "race as a proxy." Kennedy's
willingness to recognize ethnicity as a basis for a community of interest turns on the residential segregation of the minority group.200
Moreover, although Justice Kennedy has raised questions about the
constitutionality of § 2,201 he agrees that a state may engage in racebased districting to cure an "anticipated" § 2 violation, but may do
so only "as reasonably necessary." 20 2 He refuses to take what he
terms a "shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting Rights
Act," to "invoke that statute, which has played a decisive role in
redressing some of our worst forms of discrimination, to demand
the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. 2 3
Even minority vote dilution is seen only in terms of an individual
right, for "the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot
equal among voters), belongs [not] to the minority as a group [but]
to its individual members. 2 4
198. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 920 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
199. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995).
200. See id. at 919-20. Justice Kennedy is more solicitous of the rights of candidates than those of politically cohesive voters: "Only if our political system and our
society cleanse themselves of that discrimination will all members of the polity share
an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless of race." Id. at 927.
201. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that majority's holding that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act covers judicial
elections does not "address[] the question [of] whether § 2 of the [amended act as
interpreted] ... is consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution") (citation omitted).
202. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J.,concurring); see also id. at 998-99
("disagree[ing] with the apparent suggestion in Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence that a court should conduct a second predominant-factor inquiry in deciding
whether a district was narrowly tailored").
203. Miller, 515 U.S. at 928.
204. Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Shaw
II majority, states:
If a § 2 violation is proved for a particular area, it flows from the fact
that individuals in this area 'have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.' The vote-dilution injuries suf-
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3. Majoritarianism, the Individual, and the
Political System as Paramount
For Justice O'Connor, the author of Shaw I and Vera, it would
appear that the political process and districting itself are of paramount importance, rather than its ability to serve the function of
allocating power or giving voters a voice in government. Justice
O'Connor is also squarely in the camp of those who view voting
primarily, if not solely, as an individual right, with certain exceptions discussed below.
Since Justice O'Connor is a former state legislator, perhaps it
should not be surprising that she is acutely conscious of districting
as an "inherently political" process in which the courts generally
should not interfere.20 5 While Justice O'Connor would not find political gerrymandering claims justiciable,0 6 she strains to recognize
an analytically distinct claim based on a right to a "colorblind electoral process" in Shaw 1. 217 Her belief in the importance of the process
28
0
is underscored by her expressed fidelity to the two-party system,
and her philosophy that "reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.,, 209 This latter belief led her to engage in
overheated rhetoric, condemning a plan that used race coupled with
a "disregard[] [for] traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions" as
suspect, and "bear[ing] an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid. 21 ° In this legislative domain of districting, Justice
O'Connor sees the creation of minority districts as placing a government in the position of engaging in impermissible racial
stereotyping. 211

fered by these persons are not remedied by creating a safe majority-Black district somewhere else in the State.
Id. at 917 (citation omitted).
205. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that "the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally a political
affair").
206. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144.
207. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993). However, this "right" goes unmentioned in the post-Shaw I line of cases.
208. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); see also
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144-145 (attributing the strength of the United States government to the two-party system).
209. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647.
210. Id.
211. See id.
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In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, Justice O'Connor
joined the majority opinion upholding a prohibition on multiparty
candidacies. The Minnesota statute at issue prohibited candidates
from running in a primary as a "majority party" candidate as well as
running for office by nominating petition, the method for fielding
"minor" party candidates.213 Such "fusion candidacies" thereby ran
on two ballot positions. The Timmons majority viewed the burden on
the Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment right of association as
"not severe" and justified by certain valid state interests.2 14 One of
those interests was the "strong interest in the stability of [the States']
systems. 215 While a state could not ban third parties, it was free to
"enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the
traditional two-party system," based on a decision that "political
216
stability is best served through a healthy two-party system."
Thus,
for Justice
O'Connor, whether independent voters are
discrminaed
.
217
discriminated against, or other voters are deprived of the option of
voting for a third party candidate or at least the opportunity to be
informed about and perhaps assist in the strengthening of a new
party, 218 is less important than honoring the ultimate legislative goal
of maintaining a two-party system. 9
That the political system should be majoritarian in all its aspects-for example, by favoring majority parties by statutory
212.

520 U.S. 351 (1997).

213.

See id. at 353-54 n.3.

214.

See id. at 356.

215.

Id. at 366.

216.

Id. at 367.

217. Cf. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 379-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
statute as discriminating against independent voters and minor parties in order to
preserve the majorities' positions of power).
218.

See id. at 379-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing ban on fusion candi-

dacies as interfering with third party's ability to inform voters of its message); see
also id. at 381 n.11 (stating that multiple party nominations may "foster[]
more competition, participation, and representation in American politics"). But cf.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative
process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in the United
States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every level").
219. For Justice O'Connor, there is
little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and
effective government[, and that] [tihe preservation and health of our
political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on
the continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both
stability and measured change.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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enactments, tolerating or encouraging partisan gerrymandering, and
being "colorblind,"-is consistent with a position that would privilege the political system over the voters within it, and thereby would
restrict voting rights largely to the realm of individual rights.20 Justice O'Connor sees this latter proposition as supported by the
Constitution, as well as Supreme Court precedents, particularly with
the Reynolds line of cases. 1 Her position, as expressed in Bandemer is
unequivocal: "[N]o group right to an equal share of political power
was ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment."22
Henceforth, for Justice O'Connor and the justices joining her, certain
racial gerrymanders will be deemed state legislation classifying
citizens by race, and subject to strict scrutiny. ' On the other hand,
challenges to multimember and at-large districting, where plaintiffs
are required to show that such districting has the purpose and effect
of diluting the minority group's voting strength, may be treated
differently from Shaw claims, because, in her view, these arrangements "do not classify voters on the basis of race." 22'
While Justice O'Connor holds the individualistic view and abjures any political group claim, she would recognize some racial
group claims. Even here she finds it important to link this claim to
individual voters:
[W]here a racial minority group is characterized by
"the traditional indicia of suspectness" and is vulnerable to exclusion from the political process, individual
voters who belong to that group enjoy some measure
of protection against intentional dilution of their
group voting strength by means of racial gerrymandering. As a matter of past history and present
reality, there is a direct and immediate relationship
between the racial minority's group voting strength
in a particular community and the individual rights of
its members to vote and to participate in the political
process. In these circumstances, the stronger nexus
between individual rights and group interests, and the
greater warrant the Equal Protection Clause gives the
federal courts to intervene for protection against racial discrimination, suffice to render racial
gerrymandering claims justiciable. Even so, the indi220.
221.
vote).
222.
223.
224.

See generally Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367.
See infra notes 265-772 and accompanying text (discussing one-person, one478 U.S. at 147.
See id. at 151.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
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vidual's right is infringed only if the racial minority
group can prove that it has "essentially been shut out
of the political process. " 2
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides Justice O'Connor with a
measure of comfort in casting some support for racial group claims.
Thus, she is explicit in her assumption that § 2 is constitutional. 6
Therefore, when specific conditions are met,2 27 she would allow
states to rely on their obligation under the Act to create majorityminority districts as a permissible compelling state interest .2 At the
same time, she would require states to reconcile the "national commitment to racial equality" with the "complementary commitment
of [the Court's] Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to eliminate
the unjustified use of racial stereotypes."2 29 Justice O'Connor proposes that states consider race in the districting process within "a
workable framework for the achievement of these twin goals." M
Within this framework, states must, first and foremost, adhere to
traditional districting principles or risk strict scrutiny. 231 Although
states may draw majority-minority districts when they have a
"strong basis in evidence for concluding that the Gingles factors are
present, ",22 in the post-Shaw world they have little leeway in how
they may draw such districts.3
Thus, even when Justice O'Connor is willing to consider a racial
group's interest as worthy and appropriate for consideration, satisfaction of the racial group's concern will be hemmed in by
requirements that meet her other, higher-rated concerns. These con-

225. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 151-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
226. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 992 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that "states [should be allowed] to assume the constitutionality of § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, including the 1982 amendments").
227. Justice O'Connor refers to the Gingles factors, see supra notes 150-153 and
accompanying text.
228. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 992.
229. Id. at 993.

230. Id.
231. See id. at 993-94 (stating that "[o]nly if traditional districting criteria are
neglected and that neglect is predominantly due to the misuse of race [will] strict
scrutiny apply" and that "districts that are bizarrely shaped and non-compact, and
that otherwise neglect traditional districting principles and deviate substantially
from the hypothetical court-drawn district, for predominantly racial reasons, are unconstitutional") (emphasis in original).
232. Id. at 994
233. See id. at 983 ("Nonretrogression is not a license for the State to do whatever
it deems necessary to ensure continued electoral success; it merely mandates that the
minority's opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's actions.") (emphasis in original).
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cems are for the political process itself and for individuals who are
not required to show any injury, but who may claim a right to a
colorblind electoral process and be protected against speculative
harms. On the other hand members of minority racial and ethnic
groups must prove specified harms and make a specified threshold
showing.2M
B. The Functional View: The Shaw Dissenters
1. Racial Groups as Political Groups
The Shaw dissenters recognize race and ethnicity as salient indicia of political identity. Both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter
show a strong appreciation for the collective character of voting. As
Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissenting opinion in Miller, at
least one source of the Court's error is due to its reliance on "the
relevance of race in contexts distinctly unlike apportionment. ''ns
For Justice Ginsburg, it is no leap from a recognition of group
rights to see that "ethnicity defines some of these groups [as] a political reality." 2 6 Justice Ginsburg reads the Shaw I majority opinion
as permitting "state legislatures [to] recognize communities that
234.

Justice O'Connor disclaims any consideration of differential treatment:
The standard would be no different if a legislature had drawn the
boundaries to favor some other ethnic group; certainly the standard
does not treat efforts to create majority-minority districts less favorably than similar efforts on behalf of other groups. Indeed, the driving
force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to end legal discrimination against Blacks.

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (emphasis in
original). This assertion lacks some credibility. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the
Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 280-81
(highlighting Justice O'Connor's inconsistent position in agreeing in Bandemar, 478
U.S. at 132, that disappointed Democratice voters in districts drawn to ensure a
Republican victory may be "deemed to be adequately represented by the winning
candidate," but unwilling to draw same inference for White voters in a Shaw district
with a (probably Black) elected representative, presuming a lack of responsiveness
by the latter).
235. Id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Shaw I, 517 U.S. 899, 941 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing "the majority's implicit equation of the intentional
consideration of race in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act with intentional
racial discrimination"); Vera, 517 U.S. at 1051 n.5 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (noting
important distinctions in the consideration of race in varying contexts).
236. Miller, 515 U.S. at 947 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also MICHAEL C. DAWSON,
BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS 75-84 (1994)

(positing that a perception of "linked fate" reinforces a group racial identity that may
be related to racial subordination and may cross class lines and influence political
choices).
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have a particular racial or ethnic makeup ... in order to account for
interests common to or shared by the persons grouped together."' 7
She would have upheld Georgia's eleventh district because it was
clear that "race did not crowd out all other factors."' Justice Ginsburg rejects the Miller majority's characterization of the eleventh
district as having no community of interest, because the population,
although majority Black, was comprised of "fractured political, social, and economic interests. "u23 In her view, the fact of diversity in
socio-economic status among the residents of the eleventh district
did not mean that there was not a "community of interest" that
could permissibly be recognized by the state in its districting plan.
This was so because "ethnicity itself can tie people together, as volumes of social science literature have documented-even people
with divergent economic interests. For this reason, ethnicity is a
significant force in political life."'24 Nor is official recognition of this
fact a recent phenomenon. As Justice Ginsburg notes, "[t]o accommodate the reality of ethnic bonds, legislatures have long drawn
voting districts along ethnic lines."2 4' She adds that, contrary to the
views of the majority, "[tihe creation of ethnic districts reflecting felt
identity is not ordinarily viewed as offensive or demeaning to those
included in the delineation."' 4'
Justice Ginsburg's view of the group nature of voting, particularly with regard to racial or ethnic groups, is also reinforced by
history. The "rank discrimination against African Americans, as
citizens and voters" provides support for judicial intervention in
voting rights claims.' ° There was no other available method for the
court to correct discrimination by state legislatures in their enactments of various discriminatory devices, such as the White primary,
poll taxes, and grandfather clauses. 2" Thus, a legislature's use of race
in the districting process is sufficiently justified by this history of

237.

Id. at 935.

238.

Id. at 940. Justice Ginsburg noted that in contrast to the shape of North Caro-

lina's 1-85 district, Georgia's eleventh district "reflects significant consideration of
'traditional districting factors (such as keeping political subdivisions intact) and the

usual political process of compromise and trades for a variety of nonracial reasons."'
Id. (citations omitted).
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 919 (citing report of plaintiff's expert witness).
Id. at 944 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 945. See also id. at 931 n.1 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (emphasizing that

Whites lack standing to assert "the stigma Blacks supposedly suffer when assigned to
a district because of their race").
243.

See id. at 934.

244. See id. at 937 (focusing on the lack of opportunity for "self-correction [by]
disenfranchised Blacks [who] had no electoral influence, hence no muscle to lobby
the legislature for change").
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discriminatory voting practices, the shared interests of racial groups,
and the inability of those minority groups to exact demands from
the legislature. Groups of White voters and groups of Black voters
simply are not similarly situated in the concessions they may wrest
from a majority-White legislature. After all,
[s]pecial circumstances justify vigilant judicial inspection to protect minority voters-circumstances that do
not apply to majority voters. A history of exclusion
from state politics left racial minorities without clout to
extract provisions for fair representation in the lawmaking forum ....The majority, by definition,
encounters no such blockage. White voters ...do not
lack means to exert strong pressure on their state legislators. The force of their numbers is itself a powerful
determiner of what the legislature will do that does not
coincide with perceived majority interests.
2. The Importance of Politically Cohesive Groups
Justice Stevens, alone among the current justices, has consistently exhibited an understanding that voting encompasses both a
group component as well as an individual one imbued with the
Reynolds concept of "fair and effective representation."24 6 At the same
time, Justice Stevens adopts a similarly broad view of the workings
of the political system.
Justice Stevens began articulating his concept of an expansive
scope for application of the Equal Protection Clause in the voting
rights context more than twenty-five years ago in Cousins v. City
147
Council of Chicago. Justice Stevens, then a Circuit Judge, agreed
with the majority's conclusion that the City Council made certain
decisions based on race and that district court findings to the con-

245.

Id. at 948 (citations omitted) ("[Flederal constraints imposed by the

Rights Act.

.

Voting

. do not leave majority voters in need of extraordinary solicitude."). Cf.

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
political gerrymandering is a "self-limiting exercise" requiring no judicial oversight).
246.
247.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,565 (1965).
466 F.2d 830, 847-61 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (Stevens,

J.,
dissenting). Cousins presented a claim that the 1970 redistricting of the Chicago
city council's 50 wards diluted the votes of African American and Latin American
voters, as well as political independents. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment for the City, holding that, while plaintiffs race was consid-

ered in the drawing of the ward lines, their evidence had not "so clearly established
that the ward boundaries were the product of purposeful discrimination as to permit
[the appellate court]" to make that finding. Id. at 843. The Court remanded the matter
for a new trial on the claims of racial gerrymandering. See id. at 843-44.
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trary were clearly erroneous. However, Justice Stevens, unlike the
majority, would have affirmed the District Court's holding.2 In
large part, Justice Stevens' reasoned that Chicago's asserted justification for the plan-incumbent protection-should have been assessed
under different standards than the majority applied.249 Under Justice
Stevens' view, the same Equal Protection standard applied to both
racial and political gerrymandering,m and the dilution claims of
both the political independents and those of the Black and Hispanic
plaintiffs would have fared differently. Unlike members of the majority, Justice Stevens would have found the claims of both groups
justiciable2 51 In deciding the racial vote dilution claims, Justice Stevens would have looked at objective indicia of legislative purpose
to determine whether it was to "segregate or disadvantage a definable group. ,,252Aree
A review of the evidence led Justice Stevens to
conclude that affirming the district court's decision was justified,
because the plan did not violate the requirement of equal population and was neither a "flagrant gerrymander[]" in the Gomillion

248. See id. at 848.
249. The evidence showed that a principal aim in drafting the plan was the preservation of incumbents. See id. at 844. The majority concluded that in some cases this
goal may have been accomplished with at least an "awareness" of race. See also id. at
839 (citing to conflicting testimony as to whether leading alderman specifically
mentioned race when stating, in regard to certain majority-Black neighborhoods, that
"We have to save those two young guys. They can't run in those wards. Those wards
are all Black and there is nowhere for them to live.").
250. See id. at 847. Justice Stevens found support for this view in a number of
Supreme Court pronouncements. For example, the Supreme Court had made reference to "racial or economic discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149
(1971), and had specifically reserved any question of claims involving the dilution of
"racial or political elements of the voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433, 439 (1965). Particularly significant for Justice Stevens was the Whitcomb Court's
critique of the district court's holding that "any group with distinctive interests must
be represented... if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and [is
geographically compact]." Cousins, 466 F.2d at 849. The implication for Justice Stevens of this broad proposition in Whitcomb was:
This approach would make it difficult to reject claims of Democrats,
Republicans, or members of any political organization... who live in
what would be safe districts in a single-member district system but
who in one year or another, or year after year, are submerged in a
one-sided multi-member district vote. There are also union oriented
workers, the university community, religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our heterogeneous cities and urban areas.
Id. at 849 n.12.
251. See id. at 847.
252. Id. at 859.
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sense,23 nor shown to have been drafted with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. According to Justice Stevens' view, the
council's goal of protecting incumbents was permissible and the
adverse effect on plaintiffs merely incidental to achieving that
goal]5
Justice Stevens began by noting that the objective of a gerrymander was to ensure that those holding political power at the time
of the districting could shore up that power against challenges by
those with less power. In short, the gerrymander was a "means by
which the 'ins' seek to maximize their advantage over the 'outs.' ,256
It did not matter whether the "outs" were defined by racial or ethnic
characteristics or by partisan or other interests. For Justice Stevens, it
is the group's cohesive interest that is important: when an identifiable group coalesces around an issue or candidate, the group should
be accorded representation. Under this view, the composition of the
group is irrelevant-it simply does not matter whether the group is
racial, ethnic or political. 7 Rather, "it is the parallel character of the
voting of members of the group-rather than the source of their
common interests-that motivates the gerrymander."' 8
Another rationale for a uniform method of evaluating all gerrymanders was that Equal Protection tenets otherwise would be
applied differently to racial as opposed to ethnic groupsY and thus,
253. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (reversing dismissal of claim by
City of Tuskeegee voters challenging the exclusion of virtually all African American
voters through gerrymandering).
254. See Cousins, 466 F.2d at 861. In applying this standard, Justice Stevens would
have concluded that the City's justification of attempting to retain prior ward lines
was an acceptable one under an intent norm, even where a result was to dilute votes
of various racial and ethnic groups. Id. at 860. To do otherwise would mean applying
a different constitutional standard to racial gerrymandering. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613, 651 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A constitutional standard that gave
special protection to political groups identified by racial characteristics would be
inconsistent with the basic tenet of the Equal Protection Clause.")
255. See Cousins, 466 F.2d at 861 ("[Aldverse impact on the plaintiffs was in the
nature of a by-product of [a] basic plan" to retain "old ward boundaries to the extent
that [the council] could do so").
256. Id. at 847.
257. "[T]he motivation for the gerrymander is a function of the political strength
of the group at which it is directed .... the kind of characteristic-whether religious,
economic, or ethnic-that gives the group political cohesion [is irrelevant]." Id. at
852.
258. Id.
259. Justice Stevens reasoned that:
As a matter of principle, invidious discrimination against Americans
of Polish, German, or Italian ancestry is just as indefensible as discrimination against Americans of African ancestry. It seems equally
clear that such discrimination against Catholics, Jews, Protestants or
Mormons is in the same category. Unquestionably the same rules
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it could "be demonstrated that political groups are also entitled to
equal treatment., 2 ' But one-person, one-vote may also protect
groups. The fact that "political affiliation" could not justify an
"[a]bridgment of an individual's right to participate in the electoral
process, either by denying him the opportunity to vote, or by
counting his vote as worth only a fraction of the vote of another
citizen," 26 1 was further support for Justice Stevens' conclusion that
there should be no distinction in the treatment of gerrymandering
claims, whether the basis was ethnic, racial or political. Finally, Justice Stevens took into account the fact that different ethnic and racial
groups might very well share similar political interests.262
Underpinning Justice Stevens' premise of the application of
identical analyses to all types of gerrymanders is his understanding
of the group nature of voting rights. The one-person, one-vote principle has the individual as its primary focus, 26 and, as Justice
Stevens noted, "[ailmost all of the Supreme Court decisions in the
field of voting rights are concerned with discrimination which directly affects the individual right." 26' Nonetheless, the very existence
of the gerrymander confirms the reality of cohesive groups: it is
"discrimination... directed primarily at a cognizable group and,
therefore, only indirectly at its members."2 Nor would individual
plaintiffs claiming dilution have to show a direct personal injury to

must be applied to the classification of voters on grounds of national
origin, ethnicity, or religion, as race.
Id. at 850. See also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-929 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that even after Shaw I, Black voters will be treated no differently
than those of other ethnic groups); Cousins, 466 F.2d at 852 ("[Ain interpretation of
the Constitution which afforded one kind of political protection to Blacks and another kind to members of other identifiable groups would itself be invidious.");
Rogers, 458 U.S. at 652 ("[A]ll minority groups are equally entitled to constitutional
protection against the misuse of the majority's political power ....
260. Cousins, 466 F.2d at 850.
261. Id. at 851 (footnotes omitted).
262. See id. ("[Tihe practical politician will try to predict the blue collar vote, the
Black vote, the Jewish vote, the suburban vote, the Polish vote, and many others.
Such predictions are realistic reflections of the fact that various components of the
body politic share common interests .... "). See also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 651-52
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Whenever identifiable groups in our society are disadvantaged, they will share common political interests and tend to vote as a bloc. In this
respect, racial groups are like other political groups.").
263. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 747 n.6 (1983) (stating that the primary
focus of the one-person, one-vote principle is on individual rights, but it can also
serve to identify gerrymanders).
264. Cousins, 466 F.2d at 850-51 (Stevens, Cir. J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 855. See also id. at 851 n. 17 ("The gerrymander ... is aimed at groups of
citizens and is intended to diminish the likelihood that their candidates will be
elected." ).
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sue.26 For Justice Stevens, protection of the group right to vote requires more than the important principle of equal population. That
standard should also be "supplement[ed]" by a consideration of
whether the plan has a "significant adverse impact on an identifiable
political group, whether the plan has objective indicia of irregularity, and then, whether the State is able to produce convincing
evidence that the plan nevertheless serves neutral legitimate interests of the community as a whole. 267
For Justice Stevens, recognition of a group right to vote is necessary to achieve representation:
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not. Gross population disparities
violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in heavily populated districts,
as a group, the opportunity to elect the number of representatives to which their voting strength otherwise
would entitle them. While population disparities do
dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes
are combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in
heavily populated districts are free to cast their ballot
has no bearing on a claim of malapportionment. 2
While acknowledging that no group has a right to proportional representation, Justice Stevens recognizes that in a "representative
democracy, meaningful participation by minority groups in the
electoral process is essential to ensure that representative bodies are

266. The group right served as a basis for standing for the Cousins majority. Rejecting the district court's conclusion that standing depended on the assertion of an
"injury or impairment of an individual right," the appellate court recognized the
injury suffered as a group right:
[T]he interest involved in the racial or ethnic gerrymandering claim is
not limited to one's interest as a voter in a ward, but includes the interest of a Black or Puerto Rican plaintiff as a resident of the city that
the voting strength of his group is not diminished by invidious discrimination. Such interest is impaired, if plaintiffs' assertions have
merit, even though the particular plaintiff is in a ward where his
group is in the majority.
Id. at 845.
267. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751.
268.

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original); see also Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 682 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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responsive to the entire electorate. 269 In the end, it is only the aggregation of the votes cast by individual voters that impacts elections
outcomes.27 °
For Justice Stevens, merely removing restrictions on the right to
cast a ballot and the legislative creation of equally populated districts only begins the process of representation .2" Furthering the goal
of effective representation requires a recognition of the distributive
function of the political process. Indeed, if gerrymandering is about
the allocation of power, then it is appropriate to allow legislatures to
use their discretion to distribute power fairly, as the Court did in
Gaffney. 27 A corollary principle would direct courts to scrutinize
only those legislative attempts to do the opposite. Slavish adherence

269. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 640 n.21 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 752 ("[M]ere numerical equality is not a sufficient guarantee of
equal representation").
270. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 169-70 n.7 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the "'apparent[] belie[f] that effects on election results are
of little import, as long as the losers have some access to their representatives," and
pointing out that "[tihough effects on election results do not suffice to establish an
unconstitutional gerrymander, they certainly are relevant to such a claim, and they
may suffice to show that the claimants have been injured by the redistricting they
challenge").
271. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 521 (1992)
(Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (comparing third generation challenge to changes in decisionmaking authority enacted after election of the first Black candidates to the
challenges to "gerrymandering boundary lines or switching elections from a district
to an at-large basis.").
272. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (stating that "judicial
interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate political
power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite
tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so"). As Justice Stevens has stated, the decision of
whether to apply strict scrutiny to a legislative decision should turn on a number of
factors that recognize the group nature of the right to vote:
When the state action (i) has neither the intent nor effect of harming
any particular group, (ii) is not designed to give effect to irrational
prejudices held by its citizens but to break them down, and (iii) uses
race as a classification because race is "relevant" to the benign goal of
the classification.., we need not view the action with the typically
fatal skepticism that we have used to strike down the most pernicious forms of state behavior.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1010 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In
another dissent, Justice Stevens stated:
The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power
over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group.
That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power ....
Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to the equal population principle would not necessarily prevent the
latter nor encourage the former. In Justice Stevens' view, while violation of the one-person, one-vote principle has "a more direct
impact on the right to vote," it is the gerrymander that intentionally
minimizes "representation of racial or political groups," which is a
"far greater potential threat to equality of representation. ' '273 By contrast, when the state attempts to rectify prior discrimination or take
into account the fact that groups may be differently situated with
regard to their ability to use the political system to accomplish collective goals, it is assisting voters in obtaining fair and effective
representation.
Post-Shaw, however, the prospects for participation by all
groups will not be equivalent. Shaw districts are appropriate under
Justice Stevens' perspective because the creation of such districts
achieves a sharing of power. Under the Shaw cases, states are prohibited from making such political decisions. As Justice Stevens
explains:
[u]naffected by the new racial jurisprudence, majority-White communities will be able to participate in
the districting process by requesting that they be
placed into certain districts, divided between districts
in an effort to maximize representation, or grouped
with more distant communities that might nonetheless match their interests better than communities
next door. By contrast, none of this political maneuvering will be permissible for majority-minority
districts ..... 7'
Justice Stevens, adhering to a more even-handed approach, would
assess all gerrymandering, political and racial, under the same standards. For him, the impact of gerrymandering on the ability of any
cohesive minority group to gain representation is the same, regardless of the character of the group. This conclusion reflects both his
vision of voting as a group right and his recognition that racial
groups are one of the groups for whom protection is clearly envisioned.

273. Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 850 n.17 (1972) (Stevens,
Cir. J., dissenting) (quoting Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
274. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1036 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. The Court'sAlignment and the Definition of Injury
For the justices who see the right to vote as solely individual,
both the harm and the relevance of the non-voting cases they rely on
are clear. The right to drink from a water fountain, use a public park,
serve on a jury, or attend schools that are not segregated,'7 signal
that African Americans are not second-class citizens. These rights,
along with the right to register to vote and cast a ballot without
hindrance, are symbolic. There is, for these justices, a natural and
logical connection between voting and a doctrine of color-blind,
neutral individualism. The more a justice embraces the right to vote
as an individual one, the more voting is viewed as symbolic, passively signifying the voter's membership in a political community
with a one-time act performed periodically. This view of voting
requires no inquiry into the results or outcomes of participation,
thus ignoring whether minority voters are actually able to elect their
candidates of choice.
The outcome-regarding justices, however, treat the racial gerrymandering cases as more about the aggregative component of the
right to vote. In other words, they are more concerned with apportionment as it affects voting rather than voting as merely a symbolic,
one-time event. These justices factor in the group nature of voting. A
Shaw plaintiff thus suffers no injury because apportionment and
districting are about accounting for the sum of voters' characteristics; these characteristics may include the race of the voter, in
acknowledgement of the continuing salience of race in American
society.276 Apportionment is primarily about grouping people. When
politicians construct districts-and all districting is ultimately gerrymandering-it is fair to take into account all pertinent
characteristics. Just as states may take into account political considerations to create either a politically fair (or unfair) plan,27 they may
also attempt to construct a racially fair plan. This group of justices
has been identified as "racial pluralists" who view "the risk of shutting out or diluting cognizable social constituencies as the primary
evil to be avoided in the redistricting process."278 Therefore, these
justices do not find standing for individual plaintiffs who are unable
to point to, much less prove, any dilution or other disadvantage to
the racial or ethnic group to which they might belong.

275. See cases cited within Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995).
276. See Deborah Waire Post, The Salience of Race, 15 TOuRO L. REv. 351, 367 (1999)
(rejecting the popular conception that race lacks salience in contemporary society).
277. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 735 (1973).
278.

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, LEGAL STRUCTURE OF

THE POLITICAL PROCESs 593 (1998).
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III. THE NEED FOR A MORE COHERENT THEORY OF
VOTING AND DEMOCRACY

Given that the Court has left states, particularly those subject to
the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act, in a difficult
and confusing position, what lies ahead for districting in 2000? It
may be possible for states to live with Shaw. Those states that are
subject to preclearance requirements and those with significant minority populations that still have the will-or at least are subject to
pressure from interested members of the legislative body-may still
attempt to construct carefully majority-minority districts. These
states now know what kind of record might support the drawing of
such districts. Thus, states may find it useful to look more closely at
party registration data, document the existence of racial bloc voting,
and focus on communities of interest contemporaneously with the
actual districting.279
The Court also has some options to improve the current situation. The most straightforward course of action would be to abandon
the Shaw construct as a failed experiment, as Justice Stevens has
proposed.2' It is not likely, however, that the Court will reverse on
Shaw. Alternatively, a return to a pre-Miller standard would allow
the lower courts to use shape as a factor to limit the Shaw cause of
action to the most extreme instances of racial gerrymandering. More
fundamentally, the Court needs to develop a theory of representation that allows it to decide cases involving voting rights on a more
principled basis.
The essence of traditional Western democracy is popular sovereignty or consent of the governed. 281 This "consent" is given to
elected or appointed representatives who engage in political activity
that coalesces in government. One question provoked by an arrangement of indirect governance involves the concept of
"representation." Political scientists and philosophers have grappled
with the threshold question of what constitutes representation. An
279. See Stephen J. Malone, Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative
Apportionment Plan, 83 VA. L. REv. 461, 475-86 (1997) (discussing and explaining how

communities of interest may be identified using objective, subjective, and empirical
methods).
280.

See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1005 (1996) .(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Though

we travel ever farther from it with each passing decision, I would return to the welltraveled path that we left in Shaw I."). But see id. at 985 (referring to a need to adhere
to stare decisis).
281.
See MERIAM-WEBSTER'S

COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY

307 (10th

ed.

1995)

(defining "democracy" to mean "government by the people"; "rule of the majority";
or "a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised

by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving
periodically held free elections").
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in-depth discussion of democratic theory, or theories of representation, is well beyond the scope of this article. This section outlines
some of the classic theories along with more modem formulations.
A. Representation and Political Equality
1. Types of Representation
Theorists have recognized at least three formal types of representation: delegate, descriptive, and symbolc. The delegate model
denotes a person who, while not acting upon specific instructions for
each endeavor, acts generally in accord with the goals of the persons
for whom they represent.
This delegate may act as a
"spokesperson" for entities like an agent acts for a principal.2 Alternatively, this type may act more independently as a "trustee" who
does what is best for the constituency and the national interest. 285 A
descriptive representative refers to one who is seen as having characteristics similar to the persons represented,2 such that the body of
282.
283.

See A. H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 15-18 (1971).
See id. at 15-16; see also HANNA FENICHEL PrrKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REP-

RESENTATION 60-61, 74 (1967) (noting that the delegate model provides a
representative who appears to mirror the constituency may offer the advantage of
enabling the constituency to feel that it knows how the representative will act).
284. See BIRCH, supra note 282, at 15-16. The "principal" in a democracy may be
thought of as the constituency. See ROBERT G. DIXON, DEMOcRATIc REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 31 (1968). The delegate might "figuratively"

poll a constituency before any legislative vote, and act according to this understanding of the majority sentiment. See id. Alternatively, a representative might act in
accordance with his view of what is good for the people. See id. at 32; see also PITKIN,
supra note 283, at 141. Edmund Burke, on the other hand, favored a "trustee" model.
See id. at 129.
Pitkin uses the term "authorization theorist," derived from Rousseau and advanced by Thomas Hobbes, to describe the independence that arises by virtue of a
"social contract," offering members of society a refuge from anarchy in return for
conferral of authority on some government. See id. at 113. The delegate model of the
"authorization theorists" may fit within two quite different categories. The first view
states that where the "representative is free, the represented [are] bound." Id. at 55,
58-9. In the second view, the accountability view, the representative must answer for
her actions. Id. at 55. The argument favoring accountability of representation is that
holding the representative responsible for her actions will lead to "responsiveness"
to her constituents. Id. at 57.
285. See PITKIN, supra note 283, at 147. As alternatives within the delegate model,
a representative may act upon explicit instructions from voters, pursuant -to a
"mandate" from which there should be little, if any, departure. Id. at 146. In between
the poles of the "mandate-independence" controversy, might fall the representative
who uses some discretion, asking for constituent input only when a new issue arises
or who does what she thinks her constituents want until she receives new instructions. See id.
286. See BIRCH, supra note 282, at 16-17.
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representatives might be a "mirror" or microcosm of the groups
represented . Certainly, one value of this representation might be
that representatives, in furthering their own private interests, might
end up furthering those of the general population. 2" The third variant, symbolic representation, is thought to serve as an "embodiment
of a... category of persons" 289 inmuch the same way that Uncle Sam
or the American flag represents the United States, or the Union Jack
personifies England. Symbolic representatives are considered to be
likely of the three types to be responsive to the constituthe least
290
ency. Symbolic representation differs from descriptive in the
evocative connotation of the former, which functions by calling forth
a set of attitudes and beliefs. The latter simply presupposes the importance of the representative's resemblance to the constituent. 291
While neither descriptive nor symbolic representation has been
adopted as a formal theory, the long history of de jure and then de
facto racial segregation in the United States has contributed to a mistrust of representatives who do not reflect the racial or ethnic
composition of the electorate. Thus, many voters have sought some
variant of descriptive representation. Similarly, to the extent that
interest representation has occurred, it has resulted, even acciden292
tally, from the geographical aspect of districting.

287. Id. Perhaps this is the parallel of the sentiment expressed by President Clinton, when he remarked on several occasions that he would strive to appoint a
Cabinet that "looked like America."
288. This was the rationale presented by philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill. See BIRCH, supra note 282, at 55. Such a view of representation might
often be conjoined with varied notions of suffrage. See, e.g., id. at 61. Criticism of this
view has focused on both practical and theoretical problems. Some practical problems were thought to be the difficulty in obtaining a representative body that was an
actual microcosm, considering the frequency with which politicians come from
lawyering or other elite classes. The true "citizen" politician is a rarity. Another
practical problem was the difficulty of measuring the "intensity" of feeling that the
general population has with regard to the issues to be decided. Acting on any measure of intensity might require acting at odds with the feeling of the body as a whole.
See id. at 57-59. Pitkin directs her criticism of descriptive representation at its limiting
nature, for it means "being like you, not acting for you." PrrKIN, supra note 283, at
113. Moreover, it leaves little room for responsiveness, which is important for those
whom Pitkin designates as accountability theorists. See id. at 58.
289. BIRCH, supra note 282, at 17.
290. See id. at 125. Birch sees responsiveness as more likely residing in the delegate model and only moderately in the microcosm and elective types.
291. See PITKIN, supra note 283, at 111.
292.

See H. B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 99 (1960); see

also Karlan, Maps & Misreadings, supra note 179, at 177 (noting that because of racial
segregation, geography may serve as a proxy for interest).
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2. Representation of Persons or Interests
Another way to compare types of representation is to look at
whether it is the representative's duty to act on behalf of persons or
interests. Under an interest theory, the representative's obligation
might lie with the representation of "unattached interests" or of
people with identified interests. Where the focus is on the representation of interests, responsiveness to constituents is unimportant
and not necessary, except for some congruence between the actions
of the representative and the general notion of popular will is expected.294 For Edmund Burke, it was unimportant whether these
interests were represented proportionally; for others, proportionality is the penultimate factor. 2" Although interests are not wholly
ignored under the individual model, 6 the Shaw majority's view
reflects the general rejection in the United States of interest representation in favor of a view of representation in terms of individual
persons. The Court appeared to formally adopt this view in Reynolds when it stated that "[liegislators
are elected by voters, not
29
farms or cities or economic interests.,
According to H. B. Mayo, the essentials of democratic theory include "legislators who are legitimated or authorized to enact public
293. Edmund Burke, for example, was a proponent of representation as representing unattached interests, while the representation of persons with interests was a
product of Mill and other liberal political theorists. See PITKIN, supra note 283, at 168.
Under Burke's view, responsiveness to an electorate is not only unimportant, but
rather, it is inconsistent. See id. at 170. The representative must have the freedom to
make decisions that will serve the interests of those he represents, but must coordinate those interests with the national interest. See id. Others who espoused some
form of emphasis of interest representation include John Calhoun and James Madison. See BIRCH, supra note 282, at 72.
294. This view would seem to be at odds with some notions of representation as
including responsiveness. See BIRCH, supra note 282, at 106.
295. See Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxiesfor Parents,82 MINN. L. REV.
1463, 1501-1502 (1998) (contrasting views of Burke with those of theorists like John
Adams who thought that, "equal interests among the people should have equal
interests in the representative body") (footnote omitted).
296. See MAYO, supra note 292, at 97; PrrKIN, supra note 283, at 190-91. A philosophy of liberalism is generally seen as focused on the representation of persons rather
than interests, for it sees the constituents as people with interests and conceives of
interests as pluralistic. See PrrKIN, supra note 283, at 191. The individual is paramount in political liberalism, and interest is therefore personal, not free-floating and
unattached as it was for Burke. See id. at 178, 205-6.
297. American colonists favored delegates whose views would be shaped by the
results of frequent elections, preventing them from acquiring too much independence, and who would represent "sectional interests." See BIRCH, supra note 282, at 43;
See also MAYO, supra note 292, at 103, 166.
298. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also id. at 580 ("Citizens, not
history or economic interests, cast votes.... People, not land or trees or pastures,
vote.")

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 4:389

policies,. . . who are subject or responsible to popular control at free
elections," and who use majority rule for decisionmaking within the
legislative body.2 9 Regardless of the type of representation chosen
by Western democracies, and the American system in particular, the
use of periodic elections is a frequent feature. Elections, in theory,
manifest the popular will, the interests of the people by whose consent representatives govern, and may either ratify or repudiate a
representative's actions. Elections may also serve as barometers of
accountability and responsiveness, if these are considered important
to the electorate. Therefore, elections ideally provide a primary
source of authorization, as well as a means of holding a representative accountable.3 0
If elections are key to representation, they should be considered
reliable only when based on political equality. Reapportionment and
districting act as preludes to conducting elections. If the goal is
really the representation of the population, and electoral systems are
integral to accomplishing that goal, then those electoral systems
must go as far as possible to achieve political equality.
B. De-Privilegingthe One-Person, One-Vote Model
1. The Reapportionment Decisions
Legislatures engaged in districting are faced with a number of
requirements. Common among these requirements are compactness,
contiguity, and the preservation of political subdivision boundaries
and communities of interest.01 In addition to these traditional districting principles, states must also avoid minority vote dilution to
comply with the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment.2 2
Finally, there is the goal of incumbent protection, not a formal criterion, but one that is often paramount in the minds of legislators. 3°3
299. See MAYO, supranote 292, at 103, 166.
300. See id. If the goal is descriptive or symbolic representation, elections have a
purpose here as well. See PITKIN, supra note 283, at 75, 106-08.
301. See generally, Bernard Grofman, Criteriafor Districting:A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1985) (discussing each of these redistricting
requirements in greater detail). See also, Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 733-34 (1998) (cataloging
seven constraints imposed by federal law); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 144, at 527-29
(reviewing regimes of twenty-five states regarding compactness).
302. Post-Shaw, legislators in states with significant minority group populations
now find themselves torn between attempting to comply with the Voting Rights Act
on the one hand, and Supreme Court pronouncements on the other. See, e.g., Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1037 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (also noting this conflict).
303. See Kristen Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymanderer,
74 TEx. L. REv. 913, 925-28 (1993) (arguing that redistricting is defined more by the
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All these criteria are, however, subordinate to the equal population
requirement of one-person, one-vote.3
The 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,3°5 holding reapportionment
claims justiciable, started a revolution that immediately gained momentum. 3 6 In Wesberry v. Saunders,307 the Court relied on Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution to find an equal population standard in
the clause's requirement that congressional representatives "be chosen.., by the People of the several States." 38 This phrase was
interpreted to mean that the "fundamental principle of representative government is equal representation for equal numbers of
people." Each congressional district was to, "as nearly as practicable," have the same number of people.31 °
In the next group of cases, the Court addressed state legislative
reapportionment. 31 1 The conflict at the center of these cases was the

self interest driving its participants than by the democratic ideals that require it); see
also James Dao, Two (Many) Choices for 2000 Census, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at D4
(wryly describing redistricting as "incumbent protection"). But cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (holding political gerrymandering justiciable under
Equal Protection Clause). Legislative elections held near the end of the decade,
therefore, are usually viewed as most crucial because the winners play a major role
in redistricting.
304. See Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting:A Case of
the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1589, 1607 (1993) [hereinafter Guinier, The
Emperor's Clothes] (noting that mandating "absolute population equality... [means]
that equipopulous districts are more important than districts that preserve communities or leave neighborhoods intact"). The justification for this primacy is not
altogether clear. The Reynolds Court located the right to an "equally weighted vote"
in the Fourteenth Amendment, which makes no mention of the right to vote, while a
later amendment, the Fifteenth, is explicit in its command that this right not be
denied or infringed because of race. Arguably, interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be informed by the intent of the Fifteenth. See, e.g., Akhil R.
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1280-81
(1992) (arguing that the radical change embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a reinterpretation of earlier amendments).
305. 369 U.S. 186 (1992). In Baker v. Carr, the plaintiffs alleged that, by means of a
1901 statute, Tennessee arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned the seats in the
General Assembly among the state's 95 counties, and due to a failure to reapportion
them despite substantial growth and redistribution of the state's population, "they
suffered a debasement of their votes" and were thereby "denied the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment" See id. at 192-93.
306. Within a short time after the decision in Baker being announced, at least 47
reapportionment suits were filed in 34 states. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE 295 (1991).

307.
309.

376 U.S. 1 (1964).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
Id. at 56.

310.

Id. at 21.

308.

311. See, e.g., Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm.
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domination of rural over urban districts. Ever larger imbalances in
the population size of state districts had resulted from legislative
failure to redistrict for many years as population migrated from
rural to urban areas.312 Voters in heavily populated urban districts
brought suit alleging that the legislature's failure to reapportion
itself had resulted in severely malapportioned districts that violated
their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 13 For example, the plaintiffs in
Reynolds v. Sims argued that the inaction of the legislature had left
them at the mercy of a "rural strangle hold. 314
The decisions in Reynolds and its companion cases, along with
Wesberry, solidified the principle of one-person, one-vote, making it
a rallying cry akin to "taxation without representation." In the cases
that followed Reynolds, the Court extended the equal population
principle to a variety of other governmental entities31 The Court
relaxed the strict principle of population equality required for congressional districting.316
In addition to announcing an equal population requirement for
state legislative districts, the Reynolds court raised issues of representation and the scope of the right to vote. The Court, as discussed in
Part III.A., has more clearly formed ideas on the latter than on the
former. In Reynolds, the Court indicated that the constitutionally
protected right of suffrage was individual in nature.3 7 It also viewed
the right to vote as having several different connotations, including

for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
U.S. 633 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
312.

See ROSENBERG, supra note 306, at 292-94.

313.

See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 543.

314. Id.
See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (holding equal
315.
population applicable to elections of trustees to a junior college, on the ground that

the these officials performed governmental functions and were elected from districts); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (extending Reynolds rule to

local governmental units having general governmental powers over an entire geographic area).
In Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983), the Court held that popula316.

tion disparities of 10% or less in state legislative districts would be tolerated.
Congressional districts, however, would be held to a precise standard of population
equality, with the requirement that the state had the burden to justify any population
deviations. See id. at 842. For example a state might show that "divergences from a
strict population standard [were] based on legitimate considerations incident to the
effectuation of a rational state policy... " Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579. While the Court
has approved a plan with a deviation as high as 16.4% in Mahan v. Howell, 411 U.S.
922, 922 (1973), 10% seems to be presumptively constitutional. See White v. Regester,

412 U.S. 755, 776-77 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (not requiring any justification).
317.

See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
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protection from vote dilution.318 Malapportioned or unequally
populated districts would be the source of this debasement.
While Reynolds held that a "fundamental principle of repsentative [sic] government in this country is one of equal representation
for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic
status, or place of residence, 319 it also introduced a concept that it
left undefined: "fair and effective representation. '' 3' ° The Court saw
321
this as "concededly the basic aim of legislative reapportionment.,
Although Reynolds was rich in rhetoric about fair, equal, and effective representation, the opinion contained little discussion of how to
achieve this goal, beyond crafting districts of equal population. For
example, the Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause
"guarantee[s] the opportunity for equal participation by all voters"
and "democratic ideals of equality and majority rule. ''3u But the
Court did not explain how to assess a vote's "effectiveness" or what
type of districting would count as "fair." Later, the Court delved
more deeply into racial gerrymandering to decide that the Constitution required more than simply meeting the goal of population
equality. 3- But beyond articulating a prohibition of intentional minority vote dilution and, later, certain forms of partisan
gerrymandering, the Court did not state whether an analysis of
"fair" representation was to begin and end with numbers, or
whether it might encompass whether the population was actually

318. First, it encompassed more than merely casting a ballot. The Court had
emphasized in its earlier holdings that violations of the Fifteenth amendment included the right to have "one's ballot counted," see id. at 554 (quoting United States
v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915)), protected from destruction or alteration and not
"diluted by ballot-box stuffing." See id. at 554-55. Alternatively, a denial of the right
to vote could be accomplished by the use of tactics such as "racially based" gerrymandering (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 399 (1960)), or the use of White
primaries. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55. Finally, restriction of suffrage could be
accomplished "by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote, just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Id. at 560-61.
319. Id.at 561.
320. Id. at 565.
321. Id. at 566.
322. Id.
323. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (stating that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal
population standards, but invidiously discriminatory because they are employed 'to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population' ") (citations omitted); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141
(1976) (establishing that the Voting Rights Act does not permit the implementation of
a reapportionment plan that would "lead to a retrogression in the position of a racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of electoral franchise."); United
Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) (accord).
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.
,,314
beingbeing"
"represented.
Was the reference to an entitlement to "fair
and effective representation" mere rhetorical surplus or was the
Court affirmatively indicating that there was some right beyond
casting an equally weighted ballot? As one commentator has noted,
by avoiding the reversal of political question doctrine, questions of
gerrymandering and interpretation of the Guaranty Clause, and by
using the Equal Protection Clause, the "Court did not develop a full
theory of representative government. 3z The Shaw decisions continue the Court's imprisonment within a view of voting as an empty
formalistic mechanism for political equality.

2. The Limitation of the Principle of Population Equality
The Reynolds Court concluded that the one-person, one-vote
principle was part and parcel of fair and effective representation, but
the equal population principle may stand in the way of achieving
actual representation. While the equal population standard works as
a rule of procedural fairness and is congruent with the widely embraced principle of universal suffrage, it does not necessarily lead to
political equality and representation.326 It is problematic because it
misdirects the focus of reapportionment in at least two ways. First, it
overemphasizes the individualistic aspect of the right to vote at the
expense of concern for group representation and collective interests.
Second, it enhances a focus on the narrower service aspect of representation, rather than broader participatory aspects.
Some commonly-voiced critiques of formal equality are similarly applicable to the reification of the formalistic one-person, onevote requirement. Critical race theorists have faulted formal equality
for its focus on individualism, because, among other things, it im324. One electoral law scholar has taken the position that "fair and effective
representation" is nothing more than "the representation that results from elections
in which all votes are weighted equally." DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, Bandemer's Gap:
Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE

COURTS 64, 73 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). Lowenstein rejects any interpretation of
the phrase that would require measurable influence by voters "on the composition or
the product of the legislature." Id.
325.

ROYCE HANSON,

THE POLITICAL THICKET REAPPORTIONMENT

AND CON-

STITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 116 (1966).

326. See DIXON, supra note 284, at 587 (terming it a "symbol of aspiration for
fairness, for avoidance of complexity, for intelligibility in our representational process"); Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 304, at 1595-96 (noting that it is
viewed as "politically fair," since it evokes symbolic essence of democracy and is an
"attempt to equalize the purely formal opportunity to cast a ballot"). Under circumstances "where [the] rights of citizenship equally enjoyed one-person, one-vote
provides a good measure of popular control over public policy." Andrew Levine,
Electoral Power, Group Power and Democracy, in MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES (John W.
Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990) 256-57.
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pedes the dismantling of structural inequality. Formal equality can
be seen as resting on a notion of symmetry, so that any difference in
treatment between two individuals is regarded as suspect. Certainly
one flaw in an ahistorical, symmetrical approach lies in its failure to
recognize that two individuals who appear to be similarly situated in
the eyes of the law may be quite dissimilar once systemic and historical discrimination is taken into account. Rejection of the
symmetrical approach in voting would allow the Court to more
easily substitute "disadvantage" for difference, with the result that
redistricting litigation would be limited to those instances where a
plaintiff group is disadvantaged by the legislative plan, thereby
allowing state and municipal governments to craft inclusive plans
designed to redress handicaps suffered by an identifiable minority.
So long as districts are equally populated, each resident is
deemed to be equally represented. Professors Karlan and Ortiz have
termed one-person, one-vote a constitutional "tragedy '3 28 that has
had unintended consequences. They point out that the doctrine's
appeal lies in its power to change entrenched control by rural districts, its simplicity that enables citizen understanding of the
doctrine, ease of its application by the courts, and the notion that it
would allow more effective public action by avoiding the problem of
special interests. 29 But one-person, one-vote did not prevent gerrymandering or automatically lead to political fairness. Indeed,
accommodation of one-person, one-vote meant that other constraints
on gerrymandering, such as preservation of the political and geographical boundaries, gave way, and technological developments
made population manipulation even easier.3 3 Any at-large district

327. See generally KimberlM Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331
(1988) (arguing that focussing only on achieving formal equality will legitimize
thoughts of racial superiority); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality,
75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (arguing that society does not need to treat women and
men as formally equal, rather, women's unique characteristics should be recognized
and valued equally with uniquely male traits) ; Charles R. Lawrence III, Book Review, "Justice"or "Just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983)
(asserting that continuing to focus on school desegregation will only encourage
people to the erroneously belief that if formal equality has been achieved then the
only explanation for poor minority achievement is genetic inferiority).
328. See Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional.Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL

STUPIDITIES,

CONSTITUTIONAL

TRAGEDIES

180,

183-86

(William N.

Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
329. See id. at 184-85.

330. See id. at 185; see also Bandemer v. United States, 478 U.S. 109, 168 (1986)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[aidvances in computer technology achieved
since the doctrine [of one-person, one-vote] was announced have drastically reduced
its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal
population that intentionally discriminate against cognizable groups of voters.").
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could meet the population requirement, yet be so configured to
defeat a racial minority group's chance of exercising any electoral
331
power.
A racially homogeneous society might be well served by the
doctrine, since the Shaw decisions do not impede taking into account
certain other unifying features. But as the persistence of racially
polarized voting shows, the racial dynamic in American society
requires more."
The primacy of equal population has reinforced the preeminence of representation of individual interests, displacing a focus on
the question of whether the interests of politically cohesive groups
are represented which might go farther toward a goal of full representation.333 Indeed, it may displace the concerns of the very group
for whom the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted,
because the constraints of equal population prevent drawing a district where minority voters may elect a candidate of their choice. 4
An assessment of political fairness cannot, nor should it, avoid a
focus on groups. Not only do electoral choices made by an individual voter matter most when her vote is counted or aggregated with

331.
332.

See Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 107.
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 153, quoting Frank Good-

man:
Race prejudice divides groups that have much in common (Blacks
and poor Whites) and united groups (White, rich and poor) that have
little else in common than their antagonism for the racial minority
Race prejudice, in short, provides the 'majority of the whole' with
that 'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that
Madison believed improbable in a pluralistic society.'
Id. See also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1889 (1992) (commenting
that "[riace is the perfect cue" for "moving broad masses to act in a disciplined
fashion"). Republican strategist Lee Atwater's use of television commercials featuring Willie Horton, a Black prisoner paroled under a plan approved by then
Democratic Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis during the 1988 presidential
campaign is one recent example of the efficacy of such a cue.
333. The Reynolds opinion makes reference to the individual nature of the right to
vote. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562 (1964) ("[T]he rights impaired
are individual and personal.., the right to vote is personal.") (citing United States v.
Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227 (1918)). But cf. DIXON, supra note 284, at 272-73 (noting
that "[h]ow the group fares in the electoral struggle and its prospects for achieving a
'fair share of the seats' may be more important questions from the standpoint of
representation than the question of whether district population has been equalized"
within a specified percentage deviation).
334. See Richard Briffault, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 43 (pointing out how the oneperson, one-vote requirement limits the ability of government to achieve other
goals).
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those cast by others in her district, but concern about how to aggregate population groups is at the core of districting.3 It is highly
unlikely that an individual vofer, even one who is able to cast an
unimpeded vote and have it counted, but who is unable to have her
vote "aggregated" with like-minded individual voters, can have any
impact on the electoral process and achieve representation of her
interests. Aggregation or dilution claims necessarily implicate
group, rather than individual rights, and representation in a heterogeneous society requires recognition of group rights.337 Indeed, the
vote dilution cases under the Voting Rights Act underscored the
importance of discovering how "cognizable groups of voters fared,"
requiring a focus on electoral outcomes to evaluate the fairness of
the political process1 in order to decide whether the votes of Black
citizens, as a group, had been "minimized or canceled out. '339
In addition to ensuring that the focus will remain on the individualized component of voting, the equal population principle of
Reynolds-and now Shaw-inspired conception of individual voters as
being personally classified when placed in districts. This is particularly true where representation encompasses a citizen's ability to
exert post-electoral influence on governmental policy-making. Instead, equal population ends up being about service.30 In complying
335. See Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 109, 126-127 (1994) (finding three separate rights and noting that as one moves
from access to influencing legislative policy, voting is no longer purely individual in
nature); id. at 122-23 ("Representative democracy is neither exclusively individual
nor discrete but is relational and inherently group-based."); Karlan, Pessimism About
Formalism, supra note 149, at 1707 (describing the right to vote as combining features
of participation, aggregation, and governance).
336. This is because "[t]he concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not." Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986)(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 304, at 1599, 1605 (describing
the "process of geographic districting [as] collect[ing] people into units of representation by virtue of certain group characteristics or assumptions about shared
characteristics within geographic communities").
337. See Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 304, at 1591-92; IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 184-85 (1990). These authors urge
overt recognition of racial groups as necessary for the empowerment of such groups
and achieving fairness in the political process.
338. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1859 (1992).
339. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971). But cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (referring to dilution of an "individual's right to vote"). See also
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1097 (1991) (noting that
"[bilack electoral success, which apparently defined undilution, became the statutory
metaphor for equal political opportunity").
340. Constituent servicing is, of course, part of a representative's job, and one that
is valued by persons living in the district. Moreover, it is likely that the smaller the
governing body, the more important the issue becomes. Even on a statewide level,
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with one-person, one-vote, states determine first the total population
of the area using census data, and then allocate the population so
that each district fits within the allowable parameters?" The focus of
the equal population standard is on total population, which may
vary considerably from the number of eligible, registered, or actual
voters contained in that population.342Thus, one-person, one-vote
does not necessarily equalize the number of persons who are in a
position to elect candidates or have an effect on the outcome of an
election. 34 At least one federal judge has argued that the Supreme
Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence supports both a principle of equal representation and of equal voting power.3 4 The former
is served by the use of the total population, while "electoral equality" would better be served by apportioning on the basis of eligible
voters.34
Guinier argues that the representation offered by the equal
population standard is limited to ensuring that each person in the
district has "equal access" to her representative.3" If representation is
viewed primarily as a "personal relationship" between the representative and constituent,"7 equally populated districts place the voter

many voters may evaluate their representatives based almost entirely on the services
and "pork" delivered. This might well have been the case for former New York
Senator, Al D'Amato, better known by his sobriquet "Senator Pothole." See Stephen J.
Sabbeth, New Hope for Two-Party System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at L126.
341. The "ideal" district size is calculated by dividing the total population by the
number of districts. The variance or deviation of each district from this figure is then
determined and summed. The result must fit within the permitted restrictions.
342. For minority populations these differentials gave rise to the so-called 65
percent rule, designed to compensate for the youth of the minority population, as
well as lower registration and turnout rates, as compared to the non-minority population. See United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1977); see
generally BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY 120 (1992) (discussing the history and limitations of the 65 percent

rule).
343. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (noting that full and effective representation in
the political processes of states is achieved by qualified voters through elections);
Garza v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors, 918 F.2d 763, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
344. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 784-86 (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) (arguing that the principle of electoral equality is better served by apportioning by eligible voters rather than by population, since it is that segment of the
district population that wields political power and better fits with a view of voting as
an individual right).
345.

See id. at 783.

346. See Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 304, at 1599-1600 (contrasting
the "top-down view of representation," emphasizing a representative's role in providing benefits to her constituency, with the "bottom-up view of representation,"
emphasizing political participation as collective activity by voters).
347. See id. at 1610.
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in an equal position to make demands, so that each voter will get an
appropriate fractional share of a representative or an opportunity to
gain a fair share of government benefits. 34 Voters are represented
without regard to whether they voted for the representative or even
exercised the right to vote at all. 349 Moreover, even those who are
disenfranchised by operation of law, such as children and convicted
felons, are represented under this account.?"
Thus, despite its resonance as a slogan, one-person, one-vote
has nothing to do with voting and everything to do with being
"represented" in the passive tense. Pursuant to one-person, one-vote,
"representation" has come to be viewed simply as service. Districts
must be approximately equal in size so that any given representative
will not be required to service more people than another representative in a neighboring district, and any given citizen will have an
equal share of her representative's time without regard to how, or
even whether, she voted. Missing from this vision of politics is a
theory of democracy participation where voters go to the polls to
influence public policy. 5
CONCLUSION
The Court protests that it does not want to impose a theory of
democracy; but in effect it is doing just that. It has now told the
states that they are not permitted to construct districts that enhance
the ability of excluded racial and language minority groups to participate in the political process. Similarly, it has now told racial and

348. See DIXON, supra note 284, at 502 (positing that which population base is
appropriate may depend on whether "legislators are viewed as lobbyists for governmental service for their areas" or whether the "legislator [is viewed] as [a]
representative of the conscious political viewpoints of his constituency"). For the
former, total population may be appropriate, while for the latter use of narrower
base may be better, as it avoids distorting factors such as non-voting absentee military and student populations. For minority communities, however, the need for
government services may be greater than that of other communities, and thus total
population may be the relevant measure.
349. Of course, the adequacy of the representation for all constituents is more apt
to occur where the district is homogeneous, presenting similar needs and interests.
See Guinier, The Emperor'sClothes, supra note 304, at 1611.
350. See id. at 1609, 1639-40 (stating that those seeking this sort of representation
need do nothing more than move into the district); cf. Jane Rutherford, One Child,
One Vote: Proxiesfor Parents, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1463 (1998) (advocating true representation for children through proxy voting by parents).
351. See Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 304, at 1620-21
("[R]epresentation... ideally recognizes the importance of influencing public policy
decisions on behalf of constituency interests.... Accordingly, we cannot define
political fairness merely as electoral fairness that guarantees nonbiased conditions of
voting eligibility and equally counted votes.").
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ethnic minorities that they may not be part of the "pull, haul and
trade" of the political process. 2 The focus on voting as an individual
exercise leads the majority to conclude that only under very stringent circumstances may a state take steps to acknowledge a
quintessentially group right. Further, a view of voting as an individual rather than a group right adversely affects not only a group of
people who have been treated as members of a disadvantaged minority rather than as individuals, but also all individuals who seek
to participate to advance a political policy agenda-a goal that requires the empowerment of groups.
The Hays definition of who may raise a Shaw claim reflects the
view that voting does not involve interlocking events whose end
goal is effective representation of voters, resting on the Court's individualistic, symbolic, and ultimately passive view of voting. In this
way, standing doctrine-which itself has a strong individualistic
strain requiring a particularized injury to an individual-and voting
rights doctrine are congruent. For the majority, voting simply means
that qualified voters will cast a ballot that is counted equally with all
others cast in the same election, and that those voters and all who live
in that same election districtwill have a right to access a representative
who is elected. Under the majority's parochial view, one is entitled
to constituent services simply by residing within a particular area of
land. Thus, granting standing to plaintiffs raising a Shaw claim based
solely on their residence within the challenged district both reflects
and reinforces the majority's voting rights doctrine. If voters exist in
a district, they somehow enjoy democracy, and therefore they have
standing to sue. The presumption that an African American representative won't give attention to White voters who live in the district
is unacceptable to the Shaw majority. The problem is that service is
only a portion of what representation is about: voting and democracy as responsive bureaucracy. The Court honors a symbolic right
to cast a ballot and a right to get equal attention from a representative, but ignores the right to elect candidates of one's choice and to
participate in a way that counts and gains representation.
The long-term exclusion of discrete and insular groups, whose
consent is therefore not relevant, undermines the legitimacy of government, ultimately contributing to cynicism on the part of the
electorate and lack of accountability by elected officials, thereby,
harming not just minority voters but the citizenry as a whole. Without a better defined theory of democracy or an appreciation of
representation issues and the problems jurisdictions face, the Court

352. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (discussing obligation of
minority groups to avoid reliance on safe districts but rather to find "common political ground" by trying to form coalitions with other groups).
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has condemned itself to ad hoc decisionmaking because it lacks a
framework. Consequently, decisions concerning arguments about
the political process will always have potential for the inconsistency
that results from the absence of a structured legal theory. The
Court's resolution of standing in the Shaw cases demonstrates more
than a unique view of standing. It shows the Court's desperate need
for a more coherent theory of voting and democracy.

